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ABSTRACT: This Article offers a direct justification for the regulation of
insider trading from an economic perspective using the recently devel-
oped financial methodology of market microstructure. Insider trading
should be understood as a category of informed trading. Informed trad-
ing is, generally, desirable because it promotes efficient pricing. Howev-
er, lack of competition with other informed traders may allow small
groups of informed traders to extract more profits than a competitive
group of informed traders without influencing prices as much. The
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profits of informed traders take the form of a transaction cost burdening
uninformed trading. Insider trading regulation prohibits the informed
trading of traders who have monopolistic power over their information
and, thus, results in a reduction of the transaction cost informed trading
generates without significantly delaying the correction of prices. By
reducing transaction costs, insider trading regulation promotes liquidity.
Liquidity, however, also determines how broad the definition of insider
trading should be. Inferential support for these conclusions is drawn
from regulatory history.
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article offers a law and economics analysis of insider trading,
which builds upon its current theoretical discussion. The prohibition of
"insider trading" is the subject of an ongoing debate which began in
1961 soon after the SEC decided Cady, Roberts & Co.,' which intro-
duced the possibility that securities fraud provisions, primarily Rule
lOb-5 and Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act,2 may be
violated by trading with "material nonpublic" information. From the law
and economics, perspective, the initial reaction was that trading with
superior information was desirable: informed trading brings new infor-
mation to the markets causing prices to change toward their "true"
value, thus increasing market efficiency and, therefore, promoting the
optimal allocation of resources.3 This straightforward argument against
1. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
2. The text of Rule lOb-5 prohibits fraud and requires disclosure:
It shall be unlawful . . . (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act...
which operates . . . as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
Section 10(b) of the '34 Act, under which the SEC adopted Rule lb-5, delegates
rulemaking power to the SEC for the prohibition of deceptive practices:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . (b) [tio use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security'. . . any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe ....
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
3. See generally HENRY B. MANNE, INSiDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966)
(insider trading increases market efficiency because it produces desirable incentives on corporate
managers).
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the prohibition of insider trading has given the stage to a series of
much more complex-and nearly impossible to substantiate-theories
about the effect insider trading has on corporate operations and gover-
nance.
One such theory argues that, assuming managers are risk averse,
insider trading is desirable if it increases managers' risk tolerance up to
risk-neutrality in their running of the corporation.4 Risk-aversion leads
to suboptimal decisions on running the corporation. Participation in the
corporation's fate through insider trading, therefore, may ameliorate
management's risk preferences. Insider trading may also correct prob-
lems due to the payoff structure of managers, who only gain by rises
of the corporate fortune and do not lose in failure. The counter-argu-
ment to this theory is that compensation plans using options and bonus-
es to tie management compensation to corporate performance may be
more versatile and accurate in bringing about risk-neutrality and curing
the perverse incentives that the usual management compensation scheme
creates.5
A license to trade on "inside" information as part of a management
contract is argued also to have the beneficial effect of causing only the
best managers to accept such a contract and "signal" their S10.6 The
4. IL
5. Incentive conpensation plans simulate and even improve upon any beneficial effects of
insider trading to firms, particularly because they can be tailored to the risk of the firm so as
to avoid discouraging risk-averse managers from accepting the position or encouraging specula-
tive management of the corporation. See Nicholas L Georgakopoulos. A General Theory of
Regulation of Secondary Securities Markets: An Economic Analysis of Securities Fraud. Insider
Trading, and Corporate Disclosure 183-85 (1991) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard Law
School).
There are two primary quantitative works on the incentive effects of compensation through
options and bonuses. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy. Performance Pay and Top-
Management Incentives, 98 J. PoL ECON. 225, 261-62 (1990) (concluding that incentives to top
management in the form of options and bonuses are surprisingly low, possibly in reaction to
political pressures, but not comparing existing incentive compensation plans with insider trading
with respect to the effectiveness of the management incentives they produce); Eduardo F.
Lemgruber, Executive Compensation: Implications for Corporate Behavior and Insider Trading
(1986) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, U.C.LA.) (empirical study indicating that the adoption
of incentive compensation plans and the exercise of stock option compensation plans affects the
performance of the firm's shares, thus showing that the market regards option plans favorably
and that managers do have superior information when they exercise their options early).
6. See Michael J. Carney, Signalling and Causation in Insider Trading. 36 CAm. U. L
REv. 863, 886-93 (1987) (insider trading signals competent managers). For a discussion of in-
sider trading and its effect on management, see generally Frank H. Easterbrook. Insider Trading
as an Agency Problem, in PRINCIPALS AND AGEmTS: THE SrRUCnT1RE OF BusINESs 81 (John W.
Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, eds., 1985) (describing the effects of insider trading on the
agency relationship); MANNE, supra note 3 (insider trading profits are a better management
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counter to this signalling argument is obvious: acceptance of contingent
pay does not necessarily denote a skilled manager but rather denotes an
optimistic or overconfident one. Furthermore, managers, due to their
risk-aversion, may not value contingent pay as much as it costs to risk-
neutral shareholders and would prefer certainty of compensation. In
such a case the signalling argument is reversed into the "lottery-ticket"
argument: insider trading as compensation is equivalent to paying with
lottery tickets. Since it is undesirable to managers, the best will prefer
compensation packages with greater portions of fixed pay.7 Further-
more, it is necessary to mention that trading by managers based on
information that they acquire or generate in the securities of other cor-
porations (a form of insider trading across corporate boundaries that I
have called "cross-trading"8) will practically always have detrimental
effects on management loyalty.9
A different strain of argumentation, which appears in economic
literature, attempts to take into account the firm's decision to issue
shares or the individual's decision to produce.'" The present Article
incentive than options or bonuses); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of
Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret
Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 S. CT. REV. 309 [here-
inafter Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents] (insider trading and the incentives to disclose
and produce information); David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insid-
er Trading, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1449 (1986); Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule lob.5,
Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STuD. 801 (1980); Lucian Arye Bebchuck &
Chaim Fershtman, The Effects of Insider Trading on Insiders' Choice Among Risky Investment
Projects (Sept., 1990) (unpublished Discussion Paper No. 75, Program in Law and Economics.
Harvard Law School) (unfettered insider trading ensures that managers will make the value-max-
imizing choices); Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Chaim Fershtman, The Effect of Insider Trading on
Insiders' Reaction to Opportunities to "Waste" Corporate Value (Sept., 1990) (unpublished Dis-
cussion Paper No. 76, Program in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School) (unfettered insider
trading leads managers to waste corporate assets).
7. See Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, supra note 6, at 332; Scott, supra note
6, at 808.
The signalling and the lottery ticket arguments do not necessarily lie on opposite assump-
tions about managers' risk-preferences. Given different risks, of individual firms, the signalling
argument may be valid if the share price of the firm is relatively stable and not subject to
random shocks outside the control or knowledge of management. In high-risk industries, by
contrast, the lottery ticket paradigm seems much more forceful. What changes is the risk of the
compensation, not the risk-preferences of managers. See Georgakopoulos, supra note 5. at 184-
87.
8. See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Classical and Cross Insider Trading: Variations on the
Theme of Rule 10b-5, 28 AM. Bus. LJ. 109 (1990).
9. Notice, however, that this argument fails to justify.regulation opposite the Coase theorem.
Firms should have sufficient incentives to prohibit and, in fact, do prohibit cross-trading on their
own initiative.
10. This argument has been expounded upon by a number of commentators. Lawrence
[Vol. 26:1
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shows that it is not necessary to consider investment decisions by firms
in the debate on insider trading, the causal relation of which is proba-
bly too remote anyway." Moreover, the articles that advocate this the-
ory assume an a priori definition of insiders and, therefore, do not ad-
dress the issue of the optimal breadth of the definition of insiders. By
contrast, this Article not only argues for the desirability of regulation
using the empirically proven dynamics of trading, but also tries to
determine the optimal definition of insider trading."2
Ausubel points out that the fear of insider trading leads to underproduction by outsiders and
that the promise of no insider trading allows oitsiders to produce and increase their own as
well as the insiders' welfare. See Lawrence M. Ausub-l, Insider Trading in a Rational Erpecta-
tions Economy, 80 AM. ECON. REv. 1022 (1990). Notice that from the Co= theoretical per-
spective, Ausubel's argument does not favor regulation since it is to both the insider' and the
outsiders' advantage to restrict the practice.
Hayne Leland has built a model with two classes of informed traders insiders and out-
siders, as well as liquidity traders, and has included the firm's decision to mis capital. Insider
trading may be either desirable or undesirable depending on several factors. Notably, insider
trading is less desirable as the flexibility of raising new capital decrease See Hayne E. Lcland,
Insider Trading: Should it be Prohibited?, 100 L POL ECO,. 859 (1992).
In his work on the subject, Michael Manove points out that discounting by outsiders for
the danger of insider trading affects the internal investment decisions of firms, leading to over-
investment in order to lower the variance of the outcome of the investment and, therefore, less-
en the danger of insider trading and the discount by outsiders. This argument is reversed and
leads to under-investment if the variance of the outcome of corporate investment is so high that
it cannot be lessened through additional investment. See Michael Manove, 27w Harm from Insid.
er Trading and Informed Speculation, 104 QJ. ECON. 823 (1989).
The conclusions of Leland, supra, come relatively close to those of this Article. Leland's
model, however, is extremely stylized and, being a microcconomic model, is insufficiently close
to the trading action. By contrast, the analysis of this Article is founded on the trade-by-trade
examination of the interaction of traders that market microstructure makes possible.
11. The reason for the remote relevance of arguments premised on the effect insider trading
has on prices is associated with the puzzle of the "risk premium," Le. the excess return of
equity over debt after adjusting for risk. Rajnsh Mehra and Edward Prescott justify a minuscule
portion of the superior returns of equity by risk. Arguments premised on the influence of insid-
er trading on prices are therefore unlikely, particularly since insider trading will not nearly elim-
inate the 20% volatility that justifies that small portion of the equity premium. See Rainish
Mehra & Edward C. Prescott, The Equity Premium: A Puzzle, 15 J. MOxErARY ECON. 145
(1985); Stephen John Fisher, Asset Trading, Transaction Costs and the Equity Premium (July
1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). In contrast to Mehra and Prescott, who
point out that risk only explains 0.4% of the 6-8% historical equity premium, Fishr uses trans-
action costs to justify 4%, i.e. over half of the equity premium. d at 13-14, 20. For the effect
of transaction costs, see infra note 69.
12. A seemingly related analysis of insider trading using microstructure tools was also at-
tempted by Albert Kyle. See Albert S. Kyle, Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, 53
ECONOMErRICA 1315 (1985). Kyle's work, however, analyzes the strategy of insiders who are
faced with an end to trading and does not consider the possibility of changes in their numbers
and their competition. While Kyle finds that insiders, still exogenously defined correct prices at
the end of trading, this finding has little impact on the regulation of insider trading. Properly
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Previous authors have insinuated that insider trading may have
detrimental effects on market liquidity. 3 In essence, the profits of in-
formed traders are the losses of the uninformed, who avoid trading to
avoid those losses. This observation, which is explained in Part m(A),
however, is insufficient to justify a prohibition of insider trading unless
it were possible to ban all informed trading. Banning all informed trad-
ing is not only impossible, since it would require the unenforceable ban
of trading on public information, but also undesirable since informed
traders are necessary to make prices accurate so that the market allo-
cates resources optimally.
Commentators have suggested that insider trading restrictions pro-
mote the interests of the professional investment community, which is
comprised of the by-default informed traders, since corporate insiders-
are prohibited from trading. 4 One can infer that according to this
view, the prohibition of insider trading is pointless because the same
profits that the insiders would reap accrue in favor of the professional
investment community, and uninformed investors are no better off.
This Article, in justifying the prohibition of insider trading, rebuts
the notion that insider trading rules simply shift the profits of informed
trading without reducing them. This Article argues that the prohibition
of trading by a narrow group of informed traders ("insiders") that
leaves a broader group as the first informed traders (say, investment
analysts) causes more competition among informed traders, which in
turn reduces their aggregate profits. A reduction in the profits of in-
formed traders reduces the quasi-transaction cost that burdens unin-
understood, the end of trading for Kyle's insiders happens only if trading in the corporation
ceases permanently, e.g., if the corporation is de-listed from the exchange, or if it is liquidated
in a Chapter Seven proceeding (as opposed to a Chapter Eleven reorganization, where the
insider's knowledge retains its importance in the surviving reorganized entity). The date of pub-
lic disclosure is not equivalent to the end of trading in Kyle's model because the insiders can
still trade after the disclosure of their information, since they will still have greater familiarity
with it. Both empirical evidence and theoretical work support this analysis and refute Kyle's
conclusions. See infra note 61.
The competition among informed traders is also considered by the seminal article written
by Admati and Pfleiderer. See Anat tL Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, A Theory of Intraday Pat.
terns: Volume and Price Variability, I REv. FIN. STUD. 3 (1988). Their model, however, does
not examine legal constraints upon informed trading and, therefore, although very closely related,
does not address the issue of the desirability of an insider trading prohibition.
13. See Paul Fenn et al., Information Imbalances and the Securities Markets, in EUROPEAN
INsIDER DEALiNG 3, 8 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1991) (briefly referring to
information asymmetry and adverse selection as sources of transaction costs, primarily through
their effect on the bid-ask spread).
14. See Haddock & Macey, supra note 6, at 1458-59.
[Vol. 26:1
INSIDER TRADING
formed trading, and, therefore, promotes market liquidity. In this sense,
this Article justifies insider trading regulation for the first time. 5 An
understanding of this justification, i.e., that the prohibition of insider
trading increases the number of informed traders and intensifies their
competition, allows for optimization of the regulation.
This Article further argues that insider trading is a transaction cost
burdening outsiders who trade in securities markets. 6 A significant
purpose of securities regulations is, thus, regulation of transaction costs.
The existence of regulation of transaction costs in the securities markets
is justified by the peculiar but important role that the interaction of
informed and uninformed traders plays in securities pricing. Because
this setting is distinguishable from the pricing of non-financial goods,
the increased protection created by securities regulation is justifiably
limited to the securities markets.
Part II of the Article, which provides a summary of the law on
insider trading, emphasizes that insider trading is not synonymous with
informed trading: the prohibition of insider trading prohibits the trading
of only some informed traders, allowing market participation by in-
formed non-insiders; while the presence of uninformed traders is shown
to be unavoidable and irrefutable. Part II examines the interaction of
informed and uninformed traders generally. In this context, Part M1(A)
explains how the profits of informed traders are a cost to the unin-
formed and asks whether this cost may be reduced by regulatory mea-
sures. Part HI(B) examines insider trading regulation as a means to
reduce the disadvantage (cost) of uninformed trading and gives a
Coase-theoretical justification for the regulation of insider trading. Part
I(C) attempts to balance costs and benefits of regulating informed
15. In contrast to the inconclusive theoretical debate, legal practice has almost unanimously
favored the prohibition of insider trading, considering it an "unfair" practice. See, eg., Victor
Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Infonnational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws.
93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979); Roy A. Schotland. Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne,
Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L REV. 1425, 1441-42 (1967) (providing various
statements relating investor confidence to the proscription of insider trading) (citing Report of
the Special Committee on Securities Laws and Regulations. 66 A.B.A. REP. 340, 357 (1941);
Symposium, Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1010 (1966); Deder F. Vagts, Re-
forming the "Modem" Corporation: Perspectives from the German, 80 HArrY. L REV. 23. 27
(1966)). Schotland's article can also be read as giving a concrete law and economics explana-
tion--or translation-of the intuition of "unfairness" invoked by practitioners.
16. A closely related point has been made by William Wang. See William KS. Wang. Trad-
ing On Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed and Who
Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule lOb.5?, 54 S. CAL. L REV. 1217. 1234-35. 1247-48 (1981).




trading in order to find the optimal rule on insider trading. Part IV of-
fers inferential support for the theory of this Article, based on the histo-
ry of international and United States regulatory policy. The Article
concludes by pointing out that insider trading rules are complemented
by the regulations forcing corporations to disclose information.
II. DISTINGUISHING INSIDER TRADING FROM INFORMED TRADING
This Article turns on the notion that the prohibition of "insider trad-
ing" is a way to regulate informed trading. Informed trading is desir-
able because it promotes accurate pricing of securities. Only some in-
formed traders fall under definition of "insiders." Part II(A) offers a
brief exposition of the law on insider trading. Part II(B) shows that the
definition of insider trading encompasses only a small number of in-
formed traders.
A. Insider Trading Law
I
There are several sources of insider trading liability. Liability first
arises from the explicit statutory prohibitions set forth in section sixteen
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934"7 and in Rule 14e-3,"8 which
the SEC has promulgated thereunder. In addition to the statutory sourc-
es, there are three other theories which support the imposition of lia-
bility for insider trading: the recognition of the "duty to disclose or
17. 'the relevant text of § 16(b) reads:
(B) PROFITS FROM PURCHASE AND SALE OF SECURITY WITHIN SIX MONTHS
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by [a 10%] beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relation-
ship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any
sale and purchase . . . within any period of less than six months . . . shall inure to
and be recoverable by the issuer ....
15 U.S.C. § 78p (b) (1988).
18. The text of Rule 14e-3 limits its application to tender offers:
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has com-
menced, a tender offer (the "offering person"), it shall constitute a fraudulent, decep-
tive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act
for any other person who is in possession of material information relating to such
tender offer which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and
which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly from:
(I) The offering person,
(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer, or
(3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other person acting on behalf of
the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or
sold any of such securities ....
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1992).
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abstain" owed by certain insiders; the belief that insider trading rep-
resents a type of misappropriation akin to stealing; and the argument
that insider trading is a violation of mail and wire fraud statutes.
1. Statutory Prohibitions
The statutory prohibitions are of little theoretical interest. Rule 14e-
3 prohibits trading with takeover information. Although its validity was
briefly put into question by United States v. Chestman,'9 Rule 14e-3 is
correct from an economic perspective since trading with information
about takeovers, even if it were to influence prices, does not further
optimal resource allocation, neither in saving, spending, nor investment
decisions. Section sixteen, on the other hand, does not prohibit insider
trading but simply averts short-swing (short-term) trading and short-
selling by managers in the stock of their own corporation. Section
sixteen also requires reporting to facilitate its enforcement t The SEC
has defined insider trading for the purpose of section sixteen, and this
definition was recently expanded, illustrating the fact that even the
"statutory insiders" of section sixteen are subject to a flexible defini-
tion.2 1
2. Non-statutory Prohibitions
a. The "Duty to Disclose or Abstain" Theory
The original non-statutory theory used against insider trading was
19. 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct 1759 (1992). The panel deciding Chestman on the frst appellate hearing split
with respect to Rule 14e-3. Judge Miner opined that the rule was valid within the rulemaking
authority of § 14(e) because it is not "'inconsistent with the statutory mandate.'" Id. at 83
(quoting Federal Election Comm'n. v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 US. 27. 32
(1981)). Judge Miner read Rule 14e-3 as not requiring breach of a fiduciary duty in the cre-
ation of a duty to "disclose or abstain." Id. at 83. Judge Mahoney opined that the SEC "ex-
ceeded its statutorily granted authority by promulgating rule 14e-3 without including any require-
ment of a breach of fiduciary duty." Id at 84. Judge Mahoney would not uphold the rule. See
id. at 85 n.1. Judge Carman found the rule to be valid but required that it be read as including
a fiduciary violation requirement. id, at 88. By contrast, the ea bane panel found Rule 14c-3 to
be within the SEC's rulemaking authority, and applied it as written, that is. without requiring a
fiduciary breach. United States v. Chestman. 947 F.2d 551, 557. 563 (2d Cir. 1991) (ca bane),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct 1759 (1992).
20. Insider short-selling receives a slightly different treatment in that it is barred by § 16(c).
15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (1988).
21. Rules 16b-I through 16b-8 were amended, and Rules 16b-9 through 16b-ll w re m-
moved, effective May 1, 1991. The effect of the change was to expand the definition of "insid-
ers" to include individuals who have access to information but who rank lower on the corporate
ladder. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16b-1 to -8 (1992).
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based on the concept that the insider and the person on the other side
of the insider trade have a fiduciary relationship. Being a fiduciary, the
insider must disclose his information or face liability analogous to that
for deceit by concealment. This "duty to disclose or abstain" from a
transaction of conflicting interests is founded on securities fraud rules.
In Chiarella v. United States,22 the seminal case on insider trading
law, the Supreme Court stated quite clearly that the source of a duty to
disclose must be a relationship of trust between the trader and his co-
unterpart. Chiarella involved a suit against the printer for several ac-
quiring corporations. The printer decoded information concerning the
acquisitions and traded in the stock of the target companies. In exoner-
ating the printer, the Court stated:
No duty [to disclose] could arise from petitioner's relationship
with the sellers of the target company's securities, for petitioner
had no prior dealings with them. He was not their agent, he
was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers
had placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a com-
plete stranger . . ..
The common law principles barring deceit and misrepresentation
are clearly discernible in the Chiarella decision. Management and
shareholders of the same corporation are bound by fiduciary ties. Trad-
ing by management based on knowledge that is unavailable to share-
holders involves a conflict of management's interests. Because of the
bond of trust, managers have a duty to disclose their information.24
Their silence constitutes fraudulent concealment of information and is in
violation of Rule lOb-5.
The problem with the "duty to disclose or abstain" theory of liabil-
ity is that it is exceptionally narrow. Insider trading, as defined by the
theory, can only take place between shareholders and insiders of the
22. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
23. Id. at 232-33.
24. Compare the analogous provision of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 551(2)(e)
reads:
(2) One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to
disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated,
(e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about to enter into it
under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of the relationship between
them, the customs of the trade or other objective circumstances, would reasonably
expect disclosure of those facts.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(e) (1977).
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same corporation. This, however, has not always been the case. Previ-
ous cases have held that all holders of material nonpublic information
are bound by a fiduciary relationship to all investors, an interpretation
known as the "equal access" theory.5 Thus, under the duty to disclose
or abstain theories, as under section sixteen, the definition of insiders is
flexible.
b. Insider Trading as the Stealing of Information: The
Misappropriation Theory
This misappropriation theory considers profitable insider trading to
be stealing.' In establishing the misappropriation theory, the Second
Circuit, in United States v. Newman," quoted Chief Justice Burger's
dissent in Chiarella. The court stated that "the defendant 'misappropri-
ated-stole to put it bluntly-valuable nonpublic information entrusted
to him in the utmost' confidence."'" Newman, however, does not make
clear whether it is the stealing of the information or the breach of the
relationship of the trader with the source of his information that consti-
tutes securities fraud. The indictment's wording indicates that the latter
was the primary factor in the court's decision, and, thus, the misappro-
priation theory can be viewed a hybrid between the duty to disclose or
abstain theory and the "stealing" theory based mail and wire fraud
statutes. If, however, the former is true, and the "stealing" theory was
the prime motivator, the misappropriation theory and the mail and wire
fraud theory of insider trading liability are identical.
25. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en band) (Rule
10b-5 "is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all
investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material informa-
ton... ."), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Chiarella v. United States, 445 US. 222
(1980), marked the end of that period. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Chlarella supported the
dying theory of equal access to information. See id. at 249-50 (Blcckmun, . dissenting) (citing
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848; Lewelling v. First California Co., 564 F.2d 1277. 1280
(9th Cir. 1977); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951)). See also
United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978). rev'd. 445 U.S. 222 (1980);
United States v. Chamay, 537 F.2d 341, 349-50 (9th Cir. 1976) ("The duty to disclose mate-
rial information is based on a potential manipulator's duty to the investing public as a whole as
well as to particular shareholders."). cert. denied, 429 US. 1000 (1976).
26. Similarly, the mail and wire fraud theory of liability discussed in Part 1(A)(2)(c). infra,
is founded on the concept that the trader steals business information.
27. 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
28. Id at 17 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245).
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c. Insider Trading as the Stealing of Information: The Mail and Wire
Fraud Theory
Courts, when applying mail and wire fraud statutes to insider trad-
ing cases, usually base their decisions on the theory that "confidential
business information" is property. The traders' profiting on the infor-
mation through insider trading then becomes a deceptive scheme, as set
forth in the mail and wire fraud statutes.29
29. The mail and wire fraud statutes are designed to reach all "fraudulent" activity that may
use the mail, the wires or radiowaves. They are drafted with the same extremely expansive
"catchall" notion of the securities fraud provisions. In one long-winded sentence, the United
States Code makes it a criminal offense to use the mails (I) to further a scheme to defraud, (2)
to obtain money or property using false pretenses, or (3) to distribute counterfeit currency:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, represen-
tations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute,
supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obli-
gation, security or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held
out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized
depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by
the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or
knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at
the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is ad-
dressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fired not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both. If the violation affects a financial institution, such
person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30
years or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. IV 1992). See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1034-35 (2d
Cir. 1986) ("It is clear that 'confidential and nonpublic commercial information' may constitute
fraudulently misappropriated 'property' under the mail fraud statute."), aff'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987);
Newman, 664 F.2d at 19-20 ("['he indictment] clearly charges appellee with fraudulent misap-
propriation of property that did not belong to him. Intangibles such as 'confidential and
nonpublic commercial information' fall within the definition of 'property' under the mail fraud
statute.") (citing United States v. Kelly, 507 F. Supp. 495, 499-504 (E.D. Pa. 1981); United
States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1006 (2d Cir. 1980). cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981);
United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383, 1387 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896
(1978); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 336, 374 (2d Cir. 1977)).
The Newman court supported its definition of property by noting that confidential business
secrets are specifically protected in a number of criminal statutes. Newman, 664 F.2d at 19 n.4.;
see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1702 (1988); N.Y. Penal Law, §§ 155.00 & 155.30(3) (McKinney 1988);
see also United States v. Victor Teicher & Co., 726 F. Supp. 1424, 1433-34 (S.D.N.Y, 1989);
United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985).
The advance of mail and wire fraud insider trading liability has suffered only one minor
setback. In United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 571 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992), the court, although in the context of aiding and abetting in mall
and wire fraud, refused to find constructive knowledge of the confidentiality of the information




In 1987, the Supreme Court decided McNally v. United States,3 '
which narrowed the applicability of the mail and wire fraud statutes to
the taking of "property" instead of the taking of any entitlement. The
Court soon clarified McNally with its decision in Carpenter v. United
States."1 Carpenter removed any doubt that mail and wire fraud stat-
utes might be inapplicable to insider trading, by including "intangible
property" in the McNally definition of property. Carpenter involved the
trading by a Wall Street Journal columnist on the future content of his
column. The Wall Street Journal's confidential business information was
elevated to a property right, and the mail and wire fraud convictions of
the defendants were upheld unanimously.
32
The misappropriation theory involves a determination of what types
of relationships preserve the confidentiality of information. Once such a
relationship is established, any trading of confidential information is a
"misappropriation." In contrast, the mail and wire fraud theory involves
a determination of whether the source of the confidential information
protected it adequately to elevate his or her interest to a "property
right." The facts of Newman and of Carpenter fall almost squarely
within the limits of each theory.3 3 Less intuitive settings may involve
the doctor-patient relationship,' or relationships among family mem-
bers.35 Once more, the flexibility of the definition of insider trading is
30. 483 U.S. 350 (1987). The Court exonerated a public official who was prosecuted under
the mail and wire fraud statutes, reasoning that he "stole" the right to "good government" from
his constituents. Id. at 360. The Court held that the mail and wire fraud statutes apply to
"property rights" only, not to entitlements, such as the entitlement to good government. 1,1
31. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
32. IL at 28.
33. In Carpenter, for example, the Court emphasized that the Wall Street Journal had pro-
hibited its employees from trading on its information: "The official policy and pr,.ctice at the
Journal was that prior to publication, the contents of the column were the Journal's confidential
information .... [The defendant] was familiar [with the rule]:' Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 23.
34. United States v. W'llis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
35. United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.NY. 1985) (son found guilty of insider
trading under mail and wire fraud theory of liability for information he received from his father.
a corporate director, based on finding that the father.son relationship was sufficiently confidential
to support the proposition that the son "defrauded" his father by trading on the information).
The Second Circuit touched upon the circumstances where a familial relationship would support
a finding of a fiduciary relationship in United States v. Chestman. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991)
(en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. CL 1759 (1992). The court distinguished Reed on the grounds
that Reed involved repeated confidences, which may be sufficient to create the "functional
equivalent" of a fiduciary duty: "(W]e limit Reed to its essential holding- the repeated disclosure
of business secrets between family members may substitute for a factual finding of dependenc
and influence and thereby sustain a finding of the functional equivalent of a fiduciary rda-
tionship:' Id. at 569. The court ruled that there must be a pattern of sharing business secrets
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apparent.
Under all of the above theories of insider trading liability, the
breadth of the definition of "insider trading" depends significantly on
interpretation. The fiduciary breach that gives rise to the "duty to dis-
close or abstain" theory of insider trading liability will result in a much
broader definition if a fiduciary relationship is found to connect all
market participants to privately informed traders, as was the case under
the "equal access" theory.36
Under the misappropriation theory, the scope of insider trading
depends on the range of relationships that require the recipient to main-
tain the confidentiality of information. Similarly, interpretation is also
involved in determining the breadth of insider trading under the mail
and wire fraud statutes; liability hinges on the definition of information
as property.
In sum, insider trading is clearly prohibited under three primary
legal theories. The first, under which insider trading is a breach of
management's fiduciary duties to shareholders, defines insiders quite
narrowly as managers and other corporate agents trading in the stock of
their employer corporation. The misappropriation theory and the mail
and wire fraud theory are founded on the notion that an employer's
information is stolen when an employee trades on it. These latter two
theories have a wider reach, since they apply to all individuals trading
for their own account if they are using their employer's information.
The definitions of insider trading under the three primary theories, as
well as under the statutory prohibition of section sixteen, have variable
breadth. Wider definitions would reach more informed traders, and
narrower definitions would reach fewer. That some informed trading
does not fall under the current definitions shows that insider trading
rules currently disallow only part of informed trading.
B. The Existence of Informed Non-Insiders and Uninformed Traders
Among the non-insiders, many individuals trade for the purpose of
taking advantage of superior information. This group thus consists of
"informed" traders. The trading of other non-insiders is not motivated
before a fiduciary relationship can be found. More importantly, frequent sharing of secrets is
only a substitute for dependence and influence, which, in the court's opinion, are the essential
elements of a fiduciary relationship. Id The court made no further inroads, however, toward tho
determination of when a familial relationship constitutes a fiduciary relationship.
36. See supra note 25.
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by 'information. This group consists of "uninformed" traders. The pur-
pose of distinguishing insiders from both "informed" traders and from
"uninformed" traders is to show that insiders are merely a subset of the
informed. It is the interaction between informed and uninformed traders
that is critical in determining whether some informed traders should be
prohibited from trading.
Numerous cases show that using private information alone does not
give rise to liability for insider trading.37 Consider, for example, Dirks
v. SEC,3  where an investment analyst received private information
from ex-employees of Equity Funding Corporation, an insurance com-
pany. Dirks and his clients traded on the information and were prose-
cuted, but the Supreme Court exonerated them. Although this Article
stresses that exclusive holders of information should be prohibited from
trading,39 the relevance of Dirks here is that informed traders can trade
legally. As the Court noted: "Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain
solely because a person knowingly receives material nonpublic infor-
mation from an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influ-
ence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is
necessary to the preservation of a healthy market."1
Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized both the need for, and the
existence of, informed traders. Financial theory does not disagree. Effi-
cient markets do not preclude informed trading. Not only is there proof
that private information can be used to the traders' advantage, but also,
fluctuations in the trading volume do move prices, creating trading
opportunities for their correction. Empirical evidence shows both that
legitimate Section Sixteen insiders outperform the market (and are
therefore "informed") and that on the New York Stock Exchange, prices
37. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Rosenbloom v. Adams. Scott & Conway. Inc,
552 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1977) (the mere fact that a person occupies a position on organization-
al chart of corporation does not establish that he is an insider as matter of law); American
General Ins. Co. v. Equitable General Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Va. 1980) (officers of
corporation that repurchased its own shares from large stockholder prior to merger are insiders
but are not liable to stockholder for nondisclosure of merger if they do not act in their own
interest but for all shareholders, but officers are under duty to disclose merger information if
they have made a statement which requires disclosure of further information in order not to be
misleading). But see Green v. Hamilton Int'l. Corp., 437 F. Supp. 723. 728-29 ($.D.N.Y. 1977)
(insider trading liability may attach to corporation that allowed convertible debt to expire shortly
before merger if it concealed material information in this transaction with intent to defraud
plaintiffs). Green opens the issue of a fiduciary duty to holders of convertible bonds, which
raises doubts about the propriety of the decision. See id. at 729 n.4.
38. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
39. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
40. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 (footnote omitted).
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move with supply and demand shocks, thus giving rise to "inefficient"
prices. These prices are, however, corrected within five to fifteen min-
utes.41
The existence of uninformed traders is not hard to prove. The legal
system itself provides for forced liquidations in the various forms of
receivership. Trading without any attempt to exploit information, how-
ever, is much more frequent. A portion of daily trading volume is
"index arbitrage," a trading strategy that combines purchases of the
stocks that make up an index and sales of the futures contracts for the
index (or vice-versa). Profits are achieved through price differences. 42
Index arbitrage is not a "real" transaction in the sense that the number
of shares the arbitrageur buys is equal to the number of futures he
sells. Both "legs" of the trade are uninformed: the arbitrageur does not
bet on a price movement.4 Other dominant uninformed trades are
those of "portfolio insurance" or other "dynamic hedging" and "syn-
thetic" instrument strategies, where trading is automatically triggered by
market moves.' Similarly uninformed, but less prevalent, is the trad-
ing of index funds, which simply involves purchases of stocks that are
part of an index, and the trading of ordinary mutual funds, which oc-
curs when redemptions and new subscriptions by clients do not cancel
out.
41. See generally JAMES H. LORm Er AL, THE STOCK MARKET. THEORIES AND EVIDENCE
passim (2d ed. 1985) (collecting empirical work).
42. Index arbitrage is defined as follows:
(ii) "ml]ndex arbitrage" means an arbitrage trading strategy involving the purchase or
sale of a "basket' or group of stocks in conjunction with the purchase or sale, or in-
tended purchase or sale, of one or more cash-settled options or futures contracts on
index stock groups, or options on any such futures contracts (collectively, "derivative
index products") in an attempt to profit by the price difference between the "basket"
or group of stocks and the derivative index products. While the purchase or sale of
the stocks must be in conjunction with the purchase or sale of derivative index prod-
ucts, the transactions need not be executed contemporaneously to be considered Index
arbitrage.
N.Y.S.E. Rule 80A(e)(ii), 2 NYSE Guide (CCH) I 2080A (Oct. 19, 1988). Index arbitrage has
been considered to have the potential to induce undesirable excess volatility of stock prices. In
response to this, the New York Stock Exchange passed Rule 80A, which, in addition to defin-
ing index arbitrage, places some restrictions on its use. N.Y.S.E. Rule 80A(c)-(d), (e)(ii).
43. Whether prices rise or fall is irrelevant to the index arbitrageur. His profits come from
the unavoidable narrowing of the difference between the cash and the futures prices.
44. For example, an option to buy stock at a certain price can be recreated, i.e. "synthe-
sized," by automatically buying that amount of stock as the price rises and passes the option




Il. THE JUSTIFICATION OF REGULATING INFORMED TRADING BY
PROHIBITING INSIDER TRADING
Part Il described insider trading law and pointed out that the law
does not forbid all informed trading. The regulation of insider trading
consists of a partial prohibition against informed trading - a prohibi-
tion against trading by only those informed traders whom the law labels
"insiders." If the regulation of insider trading is an issue of definitions,
one can easily imagine wider as well as narrower definitions of "insid-
ers." This section uses this understanding and analyzes the prohibition
of insider trading as a type of regulation of informed trading.
Informed trading, as is generally conceded, is beneficial because it
promotes accurate securities prices. Nevertheless, maybe some informed
trading should be prohibited. Part 11(A) first explains that informed
trading, despite its beneficial nature, generates a cost. Informed traders
"take" part of the stock market returns from the uninformed traders.
Uninformed traders can avoid this by not trading. This "taking" thus
resembles a transaction cost since it can be avoided by not trading. Part
I(B) then argues in favor of the prohibition against insider trading.
Different classes of informed traders "take" different amounts in trans-
forming their information into trading profits. The amount of profits
that a class of informed traders reaps depends on how competitively the
class trades. Monopolistic informed traders extract large profits without
much beneficial adjustment of prices. Therefore, the prohibition of their
trading by calling them "insiders" is desirable. Furthermore, regulation
is necessary because neither the firms nor shareholders face sufficient
incentives to prohibit insider trading themselves. Part 1HI(C) will explain
the cost/benefit analysis that leads to the optimal insider trading rule.
A. The Transaction Cost Generated by Informed Trading
1. Insiders' Profits as Outsiders' Costs of Trading
Insiders gain at the expense of outsiders because they take advan-
tage of price movements. The result is that their profits take the form
of a transaction cost burdening outsiders. The cost to the group of
outsiders is equal to the total profits of insiders. If insiders outperform
the market by $100, outsiders as a group trail the market by $100. The
expected cost of each transaction by a member of a group is this loss
divided by the number of outsider transactions. Thus, if insiders beat
the market by $100 in a period during which outsiders made 100




Trades by outsiders against outsiders, despite the fact that one side
profits at the other's expense, do not influence the calculation. As far
as outsiders as a group are concerned, the profits of some cancel out
the losses of others. Since the transactions are not motivated by infor-
mation but are random, the expected profit or loss from them is zero.
The losses of the outsider group are caused by the fact that insiders
take advantage of price movements. If a group of traders participated
equally in all price moves, the group would perform as well as the
market. Insiders, however, cause outsiders as a group to hold less stock
before price rises and more before price drops. An example may clarify
how outsiders lose as much as insiders gain. Assume a firm with a
total capitalization of $100, $90 of which are held by outsiders and $10
by insiders. Insiders, predicting a price drop, sell $5 of their holdings,
resulting in their holding $5 for the outsiders' $95. Insiders' expecta-
tions materialize and the market falls 20%, leaving outsiders with 95%
of $80,, or $76, and insiders with $4. Insiders readjust their holdings to
10% ($8) and participate with the initial ratio in dividends until they
predict a price rise, whereupon they increase their holdings to 15%
($12). The market rises, returning to its original $100 level. Insiders
now hold $15 and outsiders $85. In the course of the two price moves
insiders first avoided losing $1 and, subsequently, gained $1 extra by
trading on their information. Thus outsiders trail the market by $2, and
45. The same effect will exist in a market with market makers, but it will be less pro-
nounced. In a market where the participants transact among themselves, the "losses" of the
uninformed are by necessity equal to the profits of the informed. The interjection of a market
maker (who stands ready to trade with anyone at the bid or ask prices that the market maker
sets) complicates the picture because he acts as a "buffer" between the informed and unin-
formed. Whenever the market maker is forced to trade with an informed trader, the market
maker is likely to be entering into a disadvantageous transaction.
The market maker reacts to those losses by widening the difference of the bid and ask
prices, i.e., the bid-ask spread. Uninformed traders trading with the market maker "reimburse"
his losses to informed traders and bear the costs of informed trading in a more tangible way-
as a wider bid-ask spread-but are further removed from the informed traders. The correlation
between the bid-ask spread and the profits of informed traders indicates that market makers
provide traders with a way to extrapolate or approximate their transaction costs that are attrib-
utable to their trading without information.
The financial literature on market makers is rapidly expanding. See generally Lawrence R.
Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Het.
erogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71 (1985) (bid-ask spread widens to reflect
information imbalances); John P. Gould & Robert 'E. Verrecchia, The Information Content of
Specialist Pricing, 93 J. POL. ECON. 66 (1985); ROBERT A. SCHWARTZ, EQUITY MARKETS:
STRuCrutRE, TRADING, AND PERFORMANCE 92-95, 387 (1988).
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insiders lead it by $2.' Inserting more trading instances and dividing
the groups into their individual members does not change the above
conclusion. If the outsiders traded only among themselves, their group
would have followed the market's performance, regardless of whether
some of the members would exceed and some would trail the market.
That insider trades are lost in a crowd of outsider trades does not
eliminate their effect. The fact that the transactions that cause the losses
of outsiders are few and difficult to discern among a plethora of inno-
cent transactions gives the losses of outsiders a statistical nature. Out-
siders who trade need not know whether they have traded opposite an
insider, but they do know that they are likely to underperform the
market more for every trade they make, specifically by the amount of
insiders' profits divided by the total number of outsider trades. This
expected loss per outsider trade is the transaction cost of trading with-
out information.'
2. Informed Versus Uninformed Traders
The exposition of the previous subsection, which used insiders as
the group whose profits generated the transaction costs of outsiders,
must be expanded. Instead of taking the definition of insiders as given,
the sum of traders who, by using information, outperform the market
("informed traders") are the source of the transaction cost of the rest
("uninformed traders")." The division of traders into informed and
46. The performance of outsiders can be tracked more closely. They started with S90. They
had to "borrow" $5 to buy the insiders' sales. Their wealth stays at $90. while their holdings
iilcrease to $95. After the 20% drop, their S95 is reduced to $76, and their wealth is $76 mi-
nus the $5 debt, that is, $71. After the sales to insiders, their holdings are reduced to $68 with
$8 of proceeds and $5 of debt, resulting in a wealth of $71. After the market returns to $100,
outsiders' holdings increase to $85, plus $3 in cash after the $5 debt repayment, for a total of
$88. Outsiders are worse off by $2 than if they had not traded.
47. The transaction cost of trading opposite insiders who report their trades under § 16 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 has been calculated. See H. Nejat Seyhun, Insiders' Prof.
its, Costs of Trading, and Market Efficiency, 16 J. FIN. ECoN. 189, 200 (1986).
Seyhun divided firms into five groups based on size of equity. Despite the higher profit-
ability of insider trades in the smallest group, that group is not the one presenting outsiders
with the highest likelihood of trading opposite an insider. Seyhun determined-that the likelihood
of trading opposite a reporting insider starts at 3.6% for the issuers under $25 million; peaks at
4.5%; and, as shareholder equity passes the $50 million mark, abruptly drops to 1.9%. 1.1%.
and 0.8% for corporations with over $50, $250 million, or over S1 billion of equity. Id. at 200-
01. The finding that the insiders of the smallest firms make more profits with les trades than
those of the next size is in harmony with the explanation of this Article if the smallest firms'
illiquidity does not sustain profitable informed trading to compete with the insiders.
48. A different categorization would seek to distinguish rational from irrational, or erring.
market participants, who make the market susceptible to fads or bubbles. Irrational traders are
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
uninformed is necessary in order to examine how different definitions
of insider traders will affect the transaction costs of the uninformed and
any social welfare that might flow from lower transaction costs and
higher liquidity.
Since informed traders were defined as the traders who outperform
the market, the setting of informed versus uninformed changes very
little from that of the previous subsection which compared the perfor-
mance of insiders and outsiders. Again, the disadvantaged uninformed
traders will participate in the market less during price rises and more
during price drops. (Economists call this phenomenon "adverse selec-
tion"). At the end of any period, uninformed traders trail the market's
performance by the amount that informed traders have outperformed the
market.49 Perceiving the profits of informed traders as a transaction
cost burdening the rest is the premise of this Article's thesis. Given this
transaction cost, the issue is whether regulation-call it "insider trading"
rules-can decrease this cost and whether this regulation is justified.
B. Monopolistic and Competitive Informed Trading: The Prohibition of
Insider Trading as a Reduction of Informed Profits
Although it may seem intuitive that banning the trading of a certain
subgroup of informed traders (by defining them as "insiders" and disal-
lowing "insider trading") may reduce the profits of informed traders, the
complexity of the financial markets does not allow us to jump to such
a conclusion. The prohibition against certain members of the class of
informed traders may simply increase profits to the rest of the class,
leaving the transaction costs borne by uninformed traders unaffected or
even enlarged.50 The primary issue, however, is to see how the opti-
mal rule on insider trading would reduce the "adverse selection" trans-
action cost of uninformed traders. The prohibition must cover the in-
formed traders who have the capacity to trade strategically.
irrelevant to the discussion of insider trading. Irrational trading, from a regulatory perspective, is
countered by disclosure, which subsidizes rational traders. See Georgakopoulos, supra note 5, at
248-94.
49. The distinction between informed and uninformed may be more intuitive if it is used to
categorize trades instead of market participants. It is unlikely that any trader or investor can
trade exclusively on superior information (or superior analysis).
50. Along these lines, commentators have argued that the insider trading rules favor market
professionals, who reap the profits that the law prohibits the insiders from taking. See Carney,
supra note 6, at 897; Haddock & Macey, supra note 6, at 1458-59; Jonathan R. Macey &




1. An Example of Regulating Informed Trading with Uninformed
Trading Kept Constant
Assume different classes of informed traders who participate with
numerous uninformed traders in a market for a single security of con-
stant liquidity. The volume of uninformed trading is constant and is not
expected to move prices. The different classes of informed traders differ
in the speed with which they reach information and in the competition
that they face. Thus the first class of traders faces no competition,5'
while each subsequent class faces not only the competition of the mem-
bers of the previous classes but also has more competing members
itself.
Competition influences the trading decision of informed traders. A
monopolist trader can expect to be able to trade repeatedly on the same
piece of information. By contrast, a trader who faces competition from
other informed traders in the transformation of information into trading
profits knows that prices will soon reflect the information, thus preclud-
ing repeated profitable trades. Competition decreases the number of
trades that can be made on the information.
Imagine that prices correct by $1 for every 100 shares traded.'
The market's liquidity is such that purchasing 100 shares raises the
price by $1. Thus a trade of size ts will be executed at a price P,
which will be a function of ts and the previous price, P0:'
51. This group can be understood as a single CEO who creates information with her actions.
No one else has the information or competes for any profits that can be made on it. A cohe-
sive group of corporate directors could have similar dynamics.
52. Although the liquidity of the market is not constant. informed trading. provided it is not
detected, would not reduce liquidity. Therefore, the assumption that trades have the same impact
on prices throughout the course of trading in this analysis is realistic and correct. There is no
reason why, as the competition among informed traders increases, they would reveal their iden-
tity (and lose profits).
53. A more explicit and formal representation (calling the reaction of prices to trading g and
allowing non-linearity by raising the trade size ts to the power v, so that slightly more complex
reactions of prices to trades can be represented) would be
p ,= P. + g - csr if cs is poscilve(purchase)
P-, - g * I cs. 1W if ts, is negarive(sale)
under the constraint that. obviously, g>O. but also that wtl. If w were to be smaller than I,
then large trades would move prices less than proportionately small trades. Such a situation
would be undesirable to the market maker because he would be inviting consolidation of small
trades into large trades by, and consequently large losses to, informed traders.
This formula is a customary starting point for financial modeling of the market. See, e.g.,
Admati & Pfleiderer, supra note 12; Kyle, supra note 12. In fact. market make do not use
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P = P0 + .01 ts
The shares are presently priced at $100, and information indicates
that their value is $120. Consider the strategy of a perfectly competitiv6
trader, i.e., one who does not expect to trade again on this information.
He will seek to maximize his profits from this single trade. His profits
consist of the distance from true the value of the price at which he
trades multiplied by the number of shares he buys. If we name the
price at which he will trade P1, true value TV, and the size of his trade
ts, his profits can be expressed mathematically as:
Profits = (TV - P) ts
or after substituting the function for P1:
Profits = (TV- Po) ts - .01 ts
The perfectly competitive informed trader will now maximize his
profits taking the first derivative of their function with respect to his
trade (ts) and equating it to zero:'
dProfi ts = ( TVPo) - 2 *. O1 ts=O0
d ts
20 - .02 ts = 0, therefore, ts = 1,000.
The fully competitive informed trader would buy 1,000 shares. That
would correct prices by $10, half-way to correction. A second trade by
another competitive trader would consist of a purchase of 500 shares
and would push price up another $5 to $115, for a total profit of
$12,500 for informed traders.
any formula, and any attempt to approximate their strategy for moving prices in response to
trades would be very complex. This function, however, is a fair approximation, because it cap-
tures in its simplicity the adverse effect that traders expect to have on prices without sacrificing
much realism. Compelling empirical proof that trades move prices as a function of their size
exists. See Jerry A. Hausman et al., An Ordered Profit Analysis of Transaction Stock Prices, 31
J. FIN. ECON. 319, 357 (1993) ("trading a larger quantity [of stock] always yields a larger price
impact."). For an empirical work using a closely related function with relative success, see Rog-
er D. Huang & Hans R. Stoll, Market Microstructure and Stock Return Predictions (1992)
(Working Paper No. 91-26, Vanderbilt University).
54. That will be a maximum because the second order condition holds.
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By contrast, the informed trader who does not face competition
knows that she may trade repeatedly on the same information. Assume,
for simplicity, that her advantage allows her only two trades. It should
be obvious that her first trade would never be as large as that of the
competitive trader.55 If the informed trader knew she could trade
twice, her first trade would be smaller than 1,000 shares and would, of
course, result in a smaller correction of prices. In her second trade,
since it would be her last, she would follow the competitive strategy. In
her first trade, however, she is aware that she expects additional profits
from her second trade. She also knows that the price before her second
trade will be the price that she sets with the first. Her profits in the
second trade are influenced by her first. The smaller the first trade, the
more profitable her second trade. By not correcting prices, she preserves
profits for her next trade. This lighter trading due to a lack of competi-
tion will be referred to as "strategic trading." Strategic trading is light
trading that does not correct prices as much as trading under competi-
tion.5" In the facts of the example, two competitive trades would push
55. We already know that her strategy that will determine her trade size in the second trade
will be:
ts2 = (TV - Pj)/.02
and that price after the second trade will, therefore, be:
P2 = P, + (TV - PI1 2
The profits she is trying to maximize are the sum from the profits of both trades:
Profit = (TV-PI) ts, + (TV-P2) 42
= (TV-PI) is, + (TV- P, - (TV-P,)12 ) (TV-Pj)J.02
After substituting the formula for P, and simplifying, her profits become
( TV-P-.0 0 1 S)
2
Pxofits = (TV- Po - .01 Cs1 ) ts + .04
Take the first derivative with respect to ts,, equate to 0 and solve for is, (which will, again, be
a maximum because the second order condition is met):
dpofits = (TV-P - .03 Cs,) /2 - 0
d rs 1
ts, = (TV - PY.03
The result is that she will maximize profits by trading 666.667 shares in both the fust and the
second trades. Notice that there is no need for discounting the future profits to their present
value because the trades take place immediately after one another.
56. In the complexity of actual securities exchanges, strategic trading would involve placing
small orders that are hidden in the order flow, thus breaking a large order into many small
ones, or placing limit orders in the middle of the spread so as not to move prices all the way
to the market maker's bid or ask. A limit order (as opposed to a market order) is an offer to
trade at a given price. Placing a limit order within the market maker's bid-ask spread would
involve, for example, offering to sell 200 shares of IBM at Sl00 if the market maker offers to
buy at $99 (bid) and to sell at S100 A (ask). If there are buyers of IBM on the market, the
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price to $115 at a $12,500 profit for the informed. The two non-com-
petitive trades push price only to $113.32, resulting in a larger profit of
$13,333 for the informed trader.
A graphical comparison of the competitive and non-competitive
trading strategies shows the effect of regulation. Consider that infor-
mation is produced after trade 0, is exclusively possessed during trade
1, and is public thereafter, i.e., in trades 2 and 3. For simplicity, as-
sume that prices correct to $120 at trade 4 (this important assumption
will be relaxed in the.next stage of this example). The only difference
between competitive and non-competitive trading is the time at which
trading starts. The informed trader is able to ensure that she will also
make the second trade, trade 2 (traders queue, for example, in order to
trade, and the exclusive possessor of information on trade 1 queues
before the public announcement). If the monopolist informed trader is
barred from trading, there will be no informed trade at time 1, but
trades 2 and 3 will be competitive. The crucial difference between the
competitive and non-competitive trading is the total profits of the in-
formed traders. In every trade the profits are the difference of the price
from true value multiplied by the size of the trade. In a three-dimen-
sional graph (time, trade size and price being the axes), this is the
product of [price minus true value] multiplied by trade size. Since the
trades form a sequence, the total profits over all trades could be called
the volume of the solids in the following graph. The difference in their
volume is the difference in the traders' profits.
limit order is 'Tilled" and the seller avoids lowering the market price to the bid. The opposite,
an aggressive trading strategy, would involve placing large orders, perhaps through the "upstairs"
block-trading offices, to be traded at market price, in essence accepting to move price to the
disadvantage of the one who initiates the trade as far as the market will require to absorb the
large trade. Strategic trading can be conceptualized as "slow" or "passive" trading, in contrast to
the "aggressive" trading of traders who face time pressure to complete their trades.
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GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE TwO-TRADE EXAMPLE
FIGuRE 1: This figure allows a visual comparison of the strategies of competitive and
non-competitive informed traders in the simplified case where they engage in only two
trades each. The i-axis represents the trades in time; the P-axis represents the price at
which each trade occurs; and the ts-axis represents trade sizes. Information becomes
public at trade 4, and we assume prices correct to S120 at that time. Information is
created after trade 0, but is exclusive during trade 1. The inner solid represents the
trading of the exclusive holder of information, who trades at trade 1 knowing that she
will be able to also trade at trade 2 on the same information (trade 3 in the inner solid
is irrelevant). Notice that trades I and 2 have the same size; the trader was not forced
to trade intensively in the first trade due to lack of competition. The outer solid is the
result of the prohibition of trading to the exclusive holder. There is no informed trading
during period 1. We see, however, how competition forces a faster approah of price to
true value as traders are forced to take full advantage of each trade separately. Ti
point of the example is that the prohibition of exclusive informed trading reduces the
profits of two informed trades from S13,333 to S12,500. If the third trade of non-com-
petitive informed traders were calculated, their profits would be even greater. (The third
trade would again be competitive and would be tr=335, P=116.6, for profits of S1,139.
which brings the total profits of informed traders if the monopolist was allowed to trade
to $14,479.)
The difference in the profits of informed traders is only one side of
the question of regulating informed trading. The prohibition of insider
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trading also causes a delay in "efficiency"-the time before prices re-
flect the new information. In the previous example price correction was
assumed to take place after four trades. This assumption is now relaxed,
and price correction is left to the forces of trading. As a slight further
modification of the previous example, allow information not to make a
direct transition from exclusive to public, but to spread gradually to in-
formed traders according to the different advantages that they may have
in getting the information. The trader with the greatest advantage reach-
es the information first. Knowing that a second trader will soon uncov-
er the information, the first trader rushes to the market and engages in
strategic trading as the sole holder of the new information. At some
point he is joined by a second trader. For the period during which the
first trader was alone he engaged in "monopolistic" strategic trading.
Thereafter, the two are "duopolist" strategic traders. Each trades know-
ing that he will only be able to participate in half the future informed
transactions. Still, trades are much smaller than under perfect competi-
tion. The extra competition, however, results in slightly larger trades
and a faster approach of price to true value. As more traders get the
information, more enter, and competition increases. As competition
increases, the rate at which price approaches true value increases as
well.
As we saw previously, 7 the trader who expects to trade not only
in the current trade but also in future trades seeks to select the trade
size that will maximize his total profits. His total profits include not
only those from the current trade but also those from his future trades.
Traders compete for trades in an environment with little order, where
each member of the crowd on the floor competes for the specialist
market-maker's attention. It should not be unreasonable to assume that
each trader expects to be chosen to participate for each future trade
with probability l1n, where n is the number of competing traders."8
To state this formally, call the total profits of the trader over all
trades TP, call current price Pi, and call the last trade before price
corrects i.,. The maximization of the total profits, keeping the compe-
tition of n traders constant and assuming that TV>P, is
57. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
58. In this context, the trader involved in the example in note 55, supra, knew she was the
sole informed trader and was certain that she would complete the next trade.
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max TP = ( TV-P i )tsj
P142 ) ts1 +2 ....
+ -1 ( TV- P1 t,) tS1n
max TP= ( TV- P ) ts + -1
ts i n
i ffn
+V (TV- Pk ) tSk
k=2+1
Already the informed trader's optimization is not solvable, primarily
because every subsequent price (i.e., Phl P1+, .... ), which determines
future profits, depends on the current trade and all trades between the
current and that subsequent trade. It is also not solvable because we
cannot derive i. Figure 2 is more complex than the above equations in
that the number of competing traders (n) changes. The example is also
simpler in that if. is set at 70. Thus, if one more informed trader enters
after every tenth trade, the total profit equation at the very first trade of
the single informed trader is









( TV- P k ) tsk
( TV- Pk tsj








Attempting to solve this problem analytically is extraordinarily
complex (at least a seventy-equation-seventy-unknown problem). It is
easy, however, to derive acceptable numerical solutions.59 Figure 2
uses such numerical solutions.60
A solution is also found for the case where the single informed
trader does not trade. The process is the same, but starts when two
traders have the information. This is equivalent to prohibiting "monop-
olistic" informed trading. The two traders start trading at the time the
second trader would enter the market in the previous scenario. Because
of the competition between the two traders, price moves toward true
value so much faster that there is practically no delay in the time of
price correction, although informed trading starts later, since it has to
wait for two informed traders. The competition also reduces the total
profits of informed traders.
The following figure presents these two scenarios. The inner, longer
solid represents the full trading, including the monopolist informed
trader. In the outer solid, trading starts only when two traders have the
information. Thus, the effect of prohibiting "insider trading" when it is
defined as monopolistic informed trading is visualized. The prohibition
of trading to the monopolist informed trader (for as long as he is a
monopolist) in this example would result in the elimination of large
amounts of profit. However, this prohibition would not influence price
correction significantly, because monopolistic strategic trading does not
correct prices much, a conclusion acknowledged by both theoretical and
empirical work in finance.6'
59. For each trade, the trade size that maximizes the total expected profits is found. Then
the next trade is optimized. After all trades have been optimized, the process is repeated. When
a new pass no longer changes the outcome, the process is terminated.
60. See infra p. 29.
61. The notion that insiders will trade strategically has been modeled. See, e.g., Jean-Jaques
Laffont & Eric S. Maskin, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider Trading on the Stock
Market, 98 J. POL ECON. 70 (1990) (presenting a model under which trading by insiders does
not influence prices sufficiently to render prices fully efficient because insiders behave strate-
gically so as to minimize the amount by which they affect market prices); Leonard J. Mirman,
& Larry Samuelson, Information and Equilibrium with Inside Traders, 99 ECON. J. 152 (Supp.
1989) (presenting a model concluding that insiders will trade less than if the market were un-
able to decode their information, with further citations on the effect of large inside traders on
prices). In contrast to this Article, however, these economic models neither reach the breadth of
the definition of insider trading, nor show how insider trading regulation may serve to contain
the adverse selection problem of uninformed traders.
These theoretical models, as well as the one presented in this Article, are supported infer-
entially by recent empirical work indicating that insider trading does not result in a full correc-
tion of prices and that insiders are able to get better executions for their transactions and even
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THE EFFECT OF PROHIBITING MONOPOLISTIC INFORMED TRADING
T- -50 40 30
60
FIGURE 2. P is price; is is trade size; i is the trade. The number of informed traders
starts at 1. One additional informed trader enters at the 31st trade and one more enters
every ten trades thereafter. Notice that the lone informed trader trades strategically. his
first trades are smaller than his last because he maximizes profits by not moving prices
early. The exterior solid represents price and trade size development if the informed
traders do not trade unless they have competition. In other words, the exterior solid
plots the case where no informed trading takes place when only one informed tr.der is
in the market. The total profits of unrestricted informed traders are 417.41, while the
prohibition of the single-trader informed trading almost halves their profits to 258.34.
The variables used were TV=120, P=00=, g --.5, w l. i=70 trades. An appendix vith
the values used for this graph and an explainaion of the lack of analytical solutions for
w-I is available from the author.
fill limit orders. See Bradford Comell & Erik Sirri, The Reaction of Investors and Stock Prices
to Insider Trading- The Case of Campbell Taggart (1991) (Working Paper No. 92-022, Harvard
Business School) (examining a single period of insider trading activity in Campbell Taggart
insiders' trades occurred after smaller adverse price moves than those of outsiders ie.. insiders
faced smaller execution costs than outsiders, and insiders were able to use limit orders); Lisa K.
Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Insider Trading and the Stock Market (1991) (Working
Paper No. 92-024, Harvard Business School) (examining a series of insider trading instances and




This example illustrates that prohibiting trading to a group of trad-
ers that can trade strategically costs little in terms of market efficiency,
but greatly reduces the profits of informed traders.62 Reduced profits
for informed traders reduce the "adverse selection" transaction cost that
burdens uninformed traders. 63
Although figure 2 involves a numerical solution, it is also applica-
ble in a general sense. Furthermore; having a numerical solution is not
detrimental. While an analytical solution would allow us to compare the
profits of informed traders with and without the prohibition of informed
trading, its value would materialize primarily if the above model were
sufficiently close to actual trading to allow its conclusions to be applied
directly. Since the model is in fact a stylized example, we will have to
extrapolate from its conclusions. The numerical solution is sufficient to
show the dynamics of the example for this purpose.
In the above examples uninformed trading was held constant. If,
however, the prohibition of monopolistic informed trading ("insider
trading") reduces the "adverse selection" transaction cost burdening
uninformed trading, the prohibition should result in more uninformed
trading. The assumption of constant uninformed trading, therefore, must
be relaxed.
2. Reducing Transaction Costs in a World of Fluctuating Uninformed
Trading
The reduction of the transaction costs that burden uninformed trad-
ers (the per-uninformed-trade profits of informed traders) is a problem
that feeds back onto itself. Success in reducing these costs increases the
volume of uninformed trading. The higher trading volume increases
62. Relaxing the construction of counting time by trades intensifies the conclusion of this
example. The notion of strategic trading is even more pronounced than in this mathematical
simplification because, in actuality, the same quantity of shares will affect price less if traded
over a long period of time. Conversely, more shares can be traded in the process of correcting
prices if the trader has more time. Traders who do not face competition usually also have more
time to spread their trades. Competition forces not only larger but also more frequent trades.
Thus, what seems in the example as equal time in a competitive versus a noncompetitive peri-
od, would in fact correspond to unequal time. Ten trades might occupy an hour without com-
petition but would occupy half a minute under competition.
63. In fact, the different classes of traders may have very different numbers of members than
in this example. An entire group of executives could act in collusion as the monopolist of the
example. A single analyst who is uncertain about his status may actually trade as if he had
competition. Using integers for the different classes is an oversimplification since the analyst
who has exclusive information but suspects a 50% probability of competition by one more ana-
lyst behaves as 1.5 traders in that he expects to reap three quarters of the future profits.
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liquidity, which is a reduction in the cost of trading for both informed
and uninformed. The cheaper trading drives both groups to trade more
and increases the profits of the informed. If the increase in liquidity
increased the profits of informed traders proportionately to the increase
in the volume of uninformed trading, the "adverse selection" transaction
costs of uninformed trading would remain unchanged and insider trad-
ing regulation would be pointless. The problem is daunting, but a very
similar issue has been answered in financial economic theory.
Puzzled by the phenomenon that trading volume tends to cluster in
certain periods of the day, Admati and Pfleiderer explain this clustering
with a theoretical model that has received empirical support. Accord-
ing to their argument, the clustering is to the advantage of uninformed
traders because it increases liquidity and it reduces the
per-uninformed-trade profits of informed traders (i.e., it reduces the
quasi transaction cost burdening uninformed traders). Informed traders
are forced to follow because they profit from the increased liquidity.
Their profits, however, increase less than proportionately to the increase
in uninformed trading. Therefore the adverse selection transaction cost
per uninformed trade is reduced. The clustering and its increased liquid-
ity are to the advantage of both.
Without getting into the mathematics of Admati and Pfleiderer's
model, it is worth an explanation. When a few uninformed traders
happen to trade concurrently, they cause the market to be more liquid
at that time.' The increased liquidity causes trades executed at that
64. See infra note 66.
65. The models of economic theory do not talk about liquidity but about depth, i.e., the
amount prices move in reaction to trades. Market "depth" is uniformly considered an element of
market "liquidity," although "liquidity" is not an easily definable term. Contemporary attempts
differ slightly. Cf. Douglas W. Diamond & Robert E. Verrecchia, Disclosure, liquidity and the
Cost of Capital, 46 J. FIN. 1325 (1991); ROBERT A. SCHVARTZ, EQUrIY MARhES 356-57
(1988); Admati & Pfleiderer, supra note 12, at 5; Kyle, supra note 12, at 1316; Marco Pagano,
Trading Volume and Asset Liquidity, 104 QJ. ECON. 255 (1989); Marco Pagano. Market Size
and Asset Liquidity in Stock Exchange Economies 18-20 (1985) (unpublished doctoral disserta-
tion, Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
Notice that the notion of market depth is contrary to the idea that supply and demand are
infinitely elastic, which is the foundation of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT). Infinitely elastic demand is an infinitely deep market. CAPM
and APT can be saved if they are interpreted as applicable to an intermediate, or a long-term
equilibrium. Empirical research has found evidence of sloping demand and supply curves. See
LORIm Er AL, supra note 41, at 69 (citing numerous empirical studies confirming the effect of
large transactions on prices); Lynn A. Stout. Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market
Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE LJ. 1235 (1990) (building a hypothesis of
sloping supply and demand curves); see generally Andrei Shleifer. Do Demand Curves for
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time to result in less of an adverse price movement. This attracts both
informed and uninformed traders. As the market gets more liquid, the
informed derive more profits given the same distance of price from true
value, which gives them an incentive to further cluster their trading.
The crucial point of the Admati and Pfleiderer model is that as
liquidity increases, the profits of informed traders and the number of
uninformed trades do not increase in a constant ratio so that the
per-uninformed-trade profits of the informed do not remain constant.
Admati and Pfleiderer argue that the increased informed-trading profits
are actually reduced when measured per uninformed trade. This reduc-
tion takes place because the increased profits available to informed
traders result in an increase in the competition among the group mem-
bers. The increased competition is expressed in more aggressive in-
formed trading, which results in faster correction of prices, which in
turn reduces informed profits from what they would have been if in-
creased in proportion to the increase in liquidity and uninformed trad-
ing.
Nothing argues against generalizing the conclusion of Admati and
Pfleiderer to changes in overall trading volume (instead of changes of
trading volume within a trading session). By contrast, their mathemati-
cal model, although designed to simulate trading during the day, is
based on a sequence of auctions and resembles more day-to-day trading
than trading within each day. Furthermore, the validity of their model's
principles is intuitive and has received empirical support.6
Stocks Slope Down?, 41 J. FIN. 579 (1986).
One study found that large trades move prices, but prices return within fifteen minutes to
a level that does not allow profits after transaction costs. See Larry Y. Dann et al., Trading
Rules, Large Blocks and the Speed of Price Adjustment, 4 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1977). All studies
were focused on the New York Stock Exchange, by far the most liquid stock market. Id.
66. See Michael J. Barclay et al., Private Information, Trading Volume, and Stock-Return
Variances, 3 REv. FIN. STuD. 233 (1990). This work offers an empirical verification of the
Admati and Pfleiderer model, supra note 12. The study involved a comparison of weekends
when the Tokyo Stock Exchange was open on Saturdays with weekends in which it was closed.
The alternative hypothesis to the Admati and Pfleiderer model, trading noise, was refuted both
because the weekly variance did not increase in the longer weeks and because U.S. stocks did
not have increased variance if traded in Tokyo on weekends. The theory that both uninformed
and informed traders will cluster in markets of great liquidity is upheld by the observation of
the low volume and return variance that stocks listed in multiple exchanges have in their sec-
ondary exchanges. Volume is concentrated in the more liquid "parent" exchange, where the
stock is principally traded. Informed trading also avoids the foreign exchanges with the result of
slowing the adjustments of prices to new information, thereby lowering efficiency. Although
these observations do not verify the process. i.e., that the decreased efficiency of foreign mar-
kets is due to reduced uninformed trading, they do correlate efficiency with volume and liquidi-
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For the purposes of securities regulation, the above model indicates
that the increase in liquidity attributable to the more vigorous unin-
formed trading that may follow the reduction of informed profits (due
to insider trading rules), will not result in an increase in the profits of
informed trading proportional to the increases in uninformed trading. By
contrast, the increased liquidity results in increased competition among
informed traders which results in a reduction of their profits per unin-
formed trade.
Commentators have also pointed out that insider trading discourages
outsider informed trading because insiders do not leave sufficient profits
for outsiders to stay in the business of pursuing information for trad-
ing.' The result of prohibiting insider trading is that outsider informed
'traders are no longer discouraged from pursuing information because the
profits of the "insiders"--despite being reduced-are available to
them.'
3. Coase Theorem Considerations Justifying Insider Trading Regulation
The reduction of transaction costs through regulation is justified be-
cause firms face insufficient incentives to reduce transaction costs them-
selves. Firms face insufficient incentives to reduce their transaction
costs, one of which is insider trading, because the effect transaction
costs have on share prices is not constant.
Transaction costs burden each shareholder in a different way de-
pending on the length of time that each expects to hold the stock. Ig-
noring transaction costs, consider a stock that offers shareholders a 10%
return. If trading. this stock costs 1% of its price, a shareholder who
expects to hold it for two years will receive an annual return of 9% af-
ter transaction costs (two years of 10% minus two trades at 1%). If the
transaction cost is reduced to .5%, then either the value of the stock
will rise in the eyes of the shareholder, or he will be able to shorten
his holding period to one year, leaving the return after transaction costs
constant at 9%. Because the reduction of transaction costs does not
become fully imbedded in price but also allows the shortening of the
holding period, firms may not receive all the benefits from reducing
ty.
67. See Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Insider Trading and The Efficiency of
Stock Prices (1990) (Working Paper No. 65, Northwestern University Kellogg Graduate School
of Management). Fishman and Hagerty posit that insider trading leads to less efficient stock
prices because it deters other traders from collecting information.
68. The same inside information will lead to fewer profits for the competing traders than it
would for the monopolist insiders. See Fishman & Hagerty, supra note 67.
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this cost. The additional benefit of more frequent trading (increased
liquidity) which follows the shortened holding period has the nature of
a public good, which suggests that regulation must address transaction
costs. The incentives for firms to reduce the transaction costs in their
shares constitutes a subject in itself, beyond the scope of this Article.
69
A similar explanation of the insufficiency of corporations' incentives
to reduce transaction costs lies in the uneven way transaction costs bur-
den shareholders. Shareholders who expect to hold shares for the long
term require little annual expense by the corporation for reducing
transaction costs. Short-term holders, however, would be willing to
69. A change in a good's transaction cost will change its price much more if the transaction
costs are small than if they are large. The effect of the change will be negligible if transaction
costs are high. The reason is that transaction costs influence the decision to invest so that assets
that are costly to trade are held for long periods. Any change in transaction costs will be amor-
tized over the long holding period. Thus, if there are several transaction costs of which firms
only control a few, then firms perceive that reducing the costs they do control has a negligible
effect on price. Firms have insufficient incentives to reduce transaction costs to the optimal level
under two primary hypotheses: (1) if firms are not aware that transaction costs influence price
more at lower levels, firms will not eliminate them; (2) even if firms know the true correlation
of price and transaction costs, they may still reduce transaction costs less than is socially de-
sirable if there is a benefit to society from low transaction costs and market liquidity which
firms do not enjoy (in essence, transaction costs are an externality). See Yakov Amihud &
Halm Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 J. FIN. ECON. 223 (1986). Amihud
and Mendelson show that the high risk-adjusted returns of small firms - the "small-finr"
anomaly of the Capital Asset Pricing Model - is explainable by transaction costs. Small firms
have larger bid-ask spreads. Therefore, they tend to be held by investors with longer holding
periods, and their returns after transaction costs are discounted for the expected holding period
of the investors who tend to hold an asset with such spreads. Those investors are the highest
valuing users of the investment with a large transaction cost. At larger spreads, the effect of a
decrease in the spread is much smaller than the effect of a comparable decrease in small
spreads. The reason is that the holding period serves to amortize the transaction costs. If the
transaction costs are large, the holding period is long, and a given change in the transaction
costs will be easily amortized because the market price need only be adjusted so as to increase
returns by the increase in transaction costs over the entire holding period. If the holding period
is short, a given change in the transaction costs would almost fully reflect on the price and the
expected return, because the price would have to adjust so as to provide the same after-transac-
tion costs return. These transaction costs, however, can only be spread over a small holding
period. Amihud and Mendelson test their return-to-spread relationship hypothesis by comparing
the statistical explanation (regression) of the risk adjusted returns by the bid-ask spread to the
statistical explanation of the risk adjusted returns by fimn size. While the bid-ask spread has a
very strong effect on excess returns, the addition of the firm size to the statistical explanation
of the returns has a negligible effect.
George Constantinides attempts to determine the relation of the "liquidity premium" de-
manded for holding an asset and its transaction costs. As traders hold the asset for longer peri-
ods with higher transaction costs, the maximum liquidity premium is much smaller than the
transaction costs. See George M. Constantinides, Capital Market Equilibrium with Transaction
Costs, 94 J. PoL. ECON. 842 (1986).
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spend handsomely on reducing transaction costs. Thus, shareholders
divide. The long-term holders will accept the least expenditure to re-
duce transaction costs offered to them, and that offer will be made by
the shareholders whose shares have the median holding period2' The
needs for reduced transaction costs for short-term holders will only be
addressed by regulation.!
C. Toward the Optimal Insider Trading Rule
When the prohibition of insider trading is understood as the prohi-
bition of monopolistic informed trading, it loses many of the undesir-
able effects-primarily the loss in efficiency-that are associated with
the prohibition. The definition of insider trading, however, is a question
of degree. Part II showed that the law on insider trading can be and
has been interpreted with very different results as to its breadth. Simi-
larly, in the context of the previous paragraphs, the issue is how many
traders are still facing insufficient competition so as to justify prohibit-
ing their monopolistic strategic trading. The breadth of this definition
must be optimized. Furthermore, in order for the regulation to have the
flexibility to adapt to the evolving markets, we must determine which
characteristics of a market should be taken into account when deter-
mining the optimal breadth of this definition. The next sections explain
the value derived from the reduction of the uninformed traders' cost of
trading, examine the costs due to an excessively broad definition and
prohibition of insider trading, and conclude that the optimal insider
trading rule must be correlated with the liquidity of the regulated mar-
ket.
70. Imagine three shareholders: a long-; a medium-; and a short-term investor. The short-term
investor proposes large expenditures for the reduction of transaction costs, and is rejected by the
other two. The long-term shareholder is also in the minority when offering his low expenditure
plan. The medium-term holder's plan, however, will be favored by the long-term holder against
that of the short-term holder. It will also be the favored compromise for the short-term holder.
but this will not lead to a satisfactory situation given his holding period.
71. A clientele effect, by which funds are distributed to investments with transaction costs
that correspond to the period for which the funds will remain invested, is possible and probably
exists. Nevertheless, the disadvantageous treatment of short-term shareholders vill persist and
will push them to switch to investments with smaller transaction costs. After the shortest-term
investment leaves a firm, the decision to reduce transaction costs is repeated, and the median-
length holder may be longer, which will lead to a further increase in transaction costs.
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1. The Benefit of Reducing the Profits of Informed Traders: Cheaper
Uninformed Trading
Previously, this Article showed that the prohibition of insider trad-
ing reduces the "adverse selection" transaction cost that burdens unin-
formed traders.72 This section shows that there is value in this reduc-
tion. Uninformed trading is not only beneficial but also unavoidable.
Uninformed trading is beneficial primarily because it increases trading
volume and, consequently, liquidity. More liquid markets offer the
equivalent of lower transaction costs for trading securities, leading to
higher prices,73 more flexible investment possibilities, and less costly
portfolio rebalancing. Uninformed trading also allows the securities
markets to avoid the trap of the "efficiency paradox."74 Finally, trading
without information may well be unavoidable: even the traders who
purchased as informed traders may have to liquidate their holdings
without having superior information.
a. The Benefit of Increased Volume as Liquidity and Low-Cost Trading
Increased trading volume expands what is intuitively known as mar-
ket liquidity. The frequency and quantity of trading that axiomatically
follows high trading volume means that the market can absorb (a) larg-
er trades, (b) in less time, and (c) with less adverse price movement
than a low-volume market. That a market with high volume will absorb
72. See supra notes 45-66 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 69 on the effect of transaction costs on prices.
74. The efficiency paradox is the situation in which a market breaks down for lack of trad-
ing as it approaches perfect efficiency because trading will cease. As all traders become per-
fectly informed, they no longer trade because the prices, reflecting perfectly their information,
are no longer advantageous. The efficiency paradox puzzled economists until the notion of un-
informed trading was sufficiently developed. Thus, informed traders are no longer considered as
trading opposite each other. Instead, they step in to trade opposite uninformed traders who, in
essence, pay the price of the transaction cost explained in the text. This solution to the efficien-
cy paradox is both intuitive and likely. If, in fact, informed traders can only trade among them-
selves, there has to be a difference in the two sides' valuation of the object of the transaction.
Further, the profits available to informed traders are minimal and no longer repeating, because
in a transaction between disagreeing informed traders only one is correct, if any. Lack of suffi-
cient profits will fall to sustain the activity of informed trading. See Sanford Grossman, On the
Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets Where Trades have Diverse Information, 31 J. FIN. 573
(1976); Paul C. Pfleiderer, Private Information, Price Variability and Trading Volume (1992)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (uninformed trading solves the efficiency par-
adox); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficien-
cy, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 622-26 (1984).
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larger trades than a market with low volume is intuitive - after all, a
large trade is but a bundle of smaller trades. A large trade in high
volume is more likely to be filled, i.e., more likely to find buyers or
sellers. The same intuition lies behind the speed with which a
high-volume market absorbs a large trade. Even if the large trade is
broken into smaller trades, they will be filled sooner in a market with
frequent trading. Similarly, if trading is frequent, a trade that cannot be
executed at the current price can find a counter offer by a small price
concession. If trades were rare, a larger discount (or premium) would
be necessary to entice market participants to trade opposite the large
trade. These effects of volume on the aspects of liquidity are, in fact,
indistinguishable. All other things being equal, higher trading volume
reduces the time and adverse price movement necessary to execute a
large transaction. With less volume, even small transactions may require
time and price concessions. Thus, increased volume leads to increased
liquidity, meaning less of an adverse effect on price by trading. This is
a reduction in the cost of trading for all market participants, informed
and uninformed.
b. Avoiding the Efficiency Paradox
The efficiency paradox states that a market will fail, i.e., trading
will stop, when prices perfectly reflect information. As the market ap-
proaches efficiency, trading will cease. 5 The theory of the efficiency
paradox assumes that trading is only motivated by information. The
efficiency paradox thus rests on the notion that market participants are
all speculators. However, the presence of the "uninformed" traders, also
known as "liquidity" traders because their trading is motivated by li-
quidity needs, averts the efficiency paradox. Once traders whose moti-
vation for trading is other than taking advantage of superior information
participate in the market, their trading causes fluctuations in supply and
demand or in prices. These deviations allow informed traders to trade
without having to trade opposite other informed traders. In essence,
informed traders stand by and match uninformed trades. The compensa-
tion of informed traders is the amount that prices have to move from
the level informed traders perceive as accurate before informed traders
will correct the prices. The amount by which the trades of uninformed
traders move prices is determined by market liquidity.
75. See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stigtliz On the Impossibility of Informationally
Efficient Markets. 70 &L. ECON. REV. 393 (1980).
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c. Unavoidability of Uninformed Trading
Even informed traders may not be able to have information at both
ends of their transactions. Informed purchasers may be forced to liqui-
date their holdings without information. Informed short-sellers may be
forced to buy back and cover their position without information. 76 To
the extent that even informed traders expect to be uninformed at the
other end of their round-trip transaction (the sale, say, that will at some
point follow the purchase), even informed traders are sensitive to the
transaction costs of trading without information. A reduction in the cost
of trading without information leads to a reduction in the cost of in-
formed trading as well. If insider trading regulation leads to the above-
described benefits, it is desirable, provided that it does not generate
even larger costs. The following section examines these possible costs.
2. The Costs of Regulating Informed Trading
A prohibition of insider trading costs more than the administration
and enforcement of rules and regulations. The reduction of the unin-
formed transaction costs comes at the cost of a reduction in the partic-
ipation of informed traders in the markets. While subsection Mll(A)
argued that the unfettered participation of informed traders generates
transaction costs, the insufficient participation of informed traders also
has its negative effects. The optimal regulation of insider trading is the
result of determining the optimal amount of informed trading. The loss
of efficiency due to an excessively wide definition of insiders consists
primarily of the delay it imposes on information reaching the market,
but it may also cause some misallocation of information-pursuit.
The undesirable effect of insufficient informed trading is a reduction
in market efficiency. While the transaction costs of uninformed trading
are also being reduced, market efficiency is reduced as the definition of
insiders is widened. As we move from no prohibition to the optimal
insider trading prohibition, the transaction costs for uninformed traders
76. Short sellers sell borrowed shares, hoping their price will fall, so that they will buy the
shares back (and return them) at a lower price than that at which they sold. Their profits con-
sist of the amount by which the short sold shares fell before the repurchase. Restrictions on
short sales may easily force short sellers to cover their positions early. For a typical example of
an informed short seller who was forced to buy back at a disadvantageous time, see Zlotnick v.
TIE Communications, 836 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1988). Zlotnick sold short a subsidiary of TIE. He
had to buy back and cover his position at a loss. The court held that he could not use the
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance on TIE's misrepresentation because his short selling
had manifested his disbelief in market "integrity," meaning that Zlotnick did not believe prices
to be unaffected by misrepresentations. Id. at 821-23.
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are greatly reduced, but the efficiency of the market is reduced only
marginally, if at all. As the definition of insiders is widened further,
however, the groups of informeU traders who would reach new infor-
mation sufficiently early while facing enough competition to correct
prices rapidly are barred from trading. While the costs of uninformed
trading may fall, the loss in efficiency may outweigh the gains of re-
duced transaction costs.
The ultimate excess in the prohibition of insider trading is to pro-
hibit all informed trading. The undesirability of such a regime is obvi-
ous: information no longer reaches the markets. Markets without infor-
mation can hardly further the optimal allocation of resources. Thus, the
cost of too wide a prohibition of informed trading is the reduction in
efficiency.
Section I11(B) showed that the prohibition on insider trading had
little effect on the efficiency of the market. The example compared how
price approaches true value after a new piece of information is created
under two alternative scenarios, one with no insider trading rules and
one with a prohibition of trading by any informed trader not facing
competition. In the unregulated scenario prices started correcting earlier.
In the scenario where the first trader had to wait for a second competi-
tor before trading, the start of the price correction was delayed. Never-
theless, prices corrected fully in approximately the same time under
both scenarios. In that sense, since the time to price accuracy did not
change significantly, the prohibition of monopolistic informed trading
was considered not to influence market efficiency adversely.
Using the same example, we could widen the prohibition of insider
trading by monopolist informed traders to include duopolist informed
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Figure 3: This graph expands from Figure 2. The graph depicts the approach of price to
true value under three different scenarios: unrestricted informed trading (lne A); pro-
hibited monopolistic informed trading (line B); and prohibited mono- or duopolistic in-
formed trading. Notice that A and B "touch" true value at the same time, while C
touches with a delay of about 8 trades. If efficiency is measured by the time until new
information is fully reflected into price, A and B are equally efficient.
While efficiency is reduced by broadening the definition of insiders,
the total profits of informed traders continue to decline. No prohibition,
we saw, results in total informed trading profits of $417.41. Prohibiting
trading by lone informed traders reduces profits to $258.34 with no
delay in efficiency. Widening the prohibition to two traders cuts profits
to $213.43 while prices correct eight periods later. Are the forty-three
units saved by the broader prohibition worth more than an eight-period
delay in efficiency? Financial economic theory is not yet able to answer
this question.
Authors in the legal field have questioned strongly what they per-
ceiye as excessive pursuit of efficiency by securities regulation.' Fi-
77. See Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock
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nance theory, not surprisingly, makes the opposite argument - that
markets for equity securities are disproportionately less efficient than
markets for debt, while it is accurate equity prices, not debt prices, that
primarily promote optimal allocation of resources and optimal mana-
gerial incentives. 7
Insider trading rules, however, hide one more unresearched cost:
they may derail the efforts of traders to pursue information. In unregu-
lated markets, the trader who reaches new information first is the one
who "brings" it to the market. Different traders may have an advantage
with different types of information. Ultimately, each type of information
will be brought to the market by the trader who faces the least cost in
doing so. Thus, the effort of pursuing information is allocated optimal-
ly. A prohibition of insider trading may interfere with this optimal
division of information pursuit. Imagine that all the traders having an
advantage with respect to a specific type of information are barred from
trading. This type of information is now open for the rest. Maybe this
will cause a class of information pursuers to switch to this new type of
information. The prohibition of trading results in delays in two types of
information, the one directly affected by the prohibition and the one
that was abandoned to pursue the information that the prohibition made
available. This misallocation of information pursuit is a secondary-and
admittedly stylized-potentially undesirable effect of insider trading
rules.
Once the costs of the excessive prohibition of insider trading (i.e.,
the reduction in efficiency, and the potential misallocation of
information pursuit) are understood, the stage is set for the determina-
tion of the optimal insider trading rule. The key is that insider trading
rules are beneficial if they eliminate profits of groups of informed trad-
ers who would not correct prices sufficiently. Those informed traders do
not offer the service of efficiency to the market. By contrast, their prof-
its are a deadweight loss, in the form of a transaction cost, to all other
traders.
3. The Optimal Insider Trading Rule
Market Pricing and Securities Regulation. 87 MIcH. L RiV. 613 (1988); see also William KS.
Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock Market is Not Efficient. 19 U.C. DAVIS L REV. 341
(1986).
78. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors and Firms
80 AM. ECON. REV. 148 (papers and proceedings 1990) (high efficiency and sensitivity of short-
term financial instruments leads managers to be predominantly concerned vth the short term).
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The history of the regulation of insider trading shows that the ex-
tensive prohibition is relatively recent - only thirty years old in the
United States, and at most fifteen in other jurisdictions.79 Since insider
trading regulation has not always been considered necessary, we should
inquire whether the attributes of securities markets *that have changed
during this period determine when insider trading rules are justified.
Furthermore, since the breadth of the definition of insider trading can
be adjusted, this search should lead us to the characteristics of the
regulated market that should influence the definition of insider trading.
The determinant of the benefits and costs of insider trading rules is
liquidity. A liquid market will benefit significantly from the prohibition
of insider trading because first, liquidity attracts informed traders and
ensures that sufficiently competitive groups will replace the banned
"insiders," and second, liquidity makes strategic trading easier and more
profitable, meaning that the insiders can perform more trades at incor-
rect prices before correcting them. Liquidity thus means large profits for
informed traders and great social gains from regulation that may reduce
these profits. Finally, liquidity, particularly to the extent that it is fol-
lowed by efficiency, reduces the cost of uninformed trading. It is the
plethora of uninformed trading that justifies the reduction in its cost
through insider trading rules. Furthermore, liquidity is a lower cost of
trading. The reduction of already low transaction costs has stronger
effects, both as a reduction of the firms' cost of capital and as a short-
ening of the traders' holding periods (a trading volume increase), than a
proportional reduction of larger costs."0
Conversely, an illiquid market may not be hurt at all by the ab-
sence of rules on insider trading. The illiquidity of the market drives
informed and uninformed traders away. Even the little trading of the
insiders in this illiquid market will move prices so they reflect more
information. In this situation, insiders will not be able to trade in
quantities that allow them large profits and burden uninformed traders
with large costs per uninformed transaction. Therefore, regulating in-
79. The UK regulated "insider dealing" in 1980 (in anticipation of stock market "big
bang"?); Japan in 1989; Switzerland in 1988; Hong Kong in 1989; France in 1967, 1983, 1988,
and 1989; Germany in 1970, 1976, and 1988; the Netherlands in 1989; and the EEC in 1989.
See generally Michael D. Mann & Lise A. Lustgarten, Internationalization of Insider Trading
Enforcement-A Guide to Regulation and Co-operation, in EUROPEAN INSIDER DEALING 339
(Klaus Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1991); Eddy Wymeersch, The Insider Trading Prohibition
in the EC Member States: A Comparative Overview, in EUROPEAN INSIDER DEALINo 65 (Klaus
Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1991).
80. See supra note 69.
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sider trading may not be justified because its object--the informed prof-
its-is small. Finally, the illiquidity transaction cost in such a market is
so high that holding periods are long; changes in transaction costs have
little effect on both the cost of capital or volume. An effort to reduce
transaction costs appears pointless.
A range of possible definitions of insider trading might extend over
increasingly large groups of informed traders. For the sake of abstrac-
tion, one can imagine alternative definitions of insider trading reaching
a single trader, or reaching that one and, say, another two, or finally,
reaching these three and another three, and so on. Each successive
group would acquire information later. Depending on market liquidity,
the definition of insider trading should be set so that the first group to
avoid "insider" status is sufficiently competitive and large to correct
prices and is unable to trade strategically, while all "insiders" will be
prohibited from trading. Furthermore, the profits of this group should
sustain its activity, or its members will exit and the competition vA
again be insufficient.
If the definition of insider trading is set imperfectly under the para-
digm of this pyramid of informed traders, social costs will arise. Thus,
if the definition of insiders is too broad, the first group to be allowed
to trade will be so delayed that market efficiency is significantly re-
duced. Furthermore, the first class of non-insiders may face excessive
competition among its members that will erode their profits, fail to
support the group, and cause its members to exit. The market will be
left with insufficient informed traders to correct the swings in prices
caused by the trading of the uninformed. The increasing volatility of
the market is a disincentive for risk-averse traders to trade, akin to a
transaction cost. The market spirals toward less volume and liquidity
without enough informed traders to render it efficient.
If insider trading is defined too narrowly, then traders who face
insufficient competition will be allowed to trade strategically before a
competitive group reaches the information. The profits of the insuffi-
ciently competitive group translate into transaction costs for the unin-
formed. The resulting reduced trading of the uninformed reduces the
market's liquidity and increases the illiquidity transaction cost for in-
formed traders as well. Further, if insiders do cause some price cor-
rection, they eliminate some of the potential profits of the informed
outsiders, who may exit informed trading, thus reducing the markets'
efficiency.81
81. It appears that even small incidents of insider trading cause some price correction. See
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A different problem arises if the market to be regulated contains an
imbalance between informed and uninformed trading. Examining the
imbalance of informed and uninformed trading may be a worthwhile
diversion since the conclusions of this Article rest upon the unimpeded
interaction of the informed and uninformed. Excessive informed trading
leads to the "efficiency paradox" of little trading because of perfect
pricing.82 Some may consider the German stock market an example of
such a state.83 Conversely, domination by uninformed traders leads to
great liquidity but little efficiency, as the prices move in response to
uninformed supply and demand without sufficient informed trading to
correct them. An example of this may be the Hong Kong or United
States marketY4 Since both insufficient informed as well as insufficient
uninformed trading are undesirable, we should inquire how regulation
may assist in bringing those markets into equilibrium. Both appear to
be curable with the appropriate disclosure rules, which complement
insider trading regulation. Some examples may indicate the process.
Consider, first, a market near the efficiency paradox. It is dominat-
ed by informed investors who rarely trade because the accuracy of
market prices does not provide them advantageous trading opportunities.
Uninformed traders cannot enter, despite the efficiency, because their
trading would be misunderstood as informed trading and would cause
prices to move excessively to their disadvantage. The puzzle is why
informed traders allow such price movements and do not stand by to
correct price discrepancies. If the reason is that they face insufficient
competition, and therefore their best strategy is to allow such price
moves so that they can subsequently trade strategically, then proper
disclosure rules could be a solution. Disclosure, by providing free infor-
Meulbroek. supra note 61.
82. For a brilliant theoretical exposition of the problems arising from different mixes of
informed and uninformed trading with respect to the efficiency paradox (in the case where in-
formed trading is dominant) and inefficient random prices (in the case where uninformed trading
is dominant), see Pfleiderer, supra note 74.
83. Inference of the stability of inflation-adjusted prices of the German securities market can
be drawn from a work by Edgar Peters which applies alternative methodologies (chaotic or
fractal analysis). Mr. Peters finds that the growth-adjusted prices of German securities have
"show[n] remarkable stability." EDGAR E. PETERS, CHAOs AND ORDER IN THE CAPITAL MAR-
KErs 167 (1991). Growth-adjustment was used as a proxy for inflation-adjustment of prices
because sufficient inflation data was unavailable.
84. Voluminous evidence that the volatility of the U.S. market is unjustified by a present.
value model of dividend changes has been produced by Professor Shiller. See ROBERT J.
SH E, MARKET VOLATmIUY (1989) (collecting his earlier work); Robert J. Shiller, Market
Volatility and Investor Behavior, 80 AM. ECON. REv. 58 (1990); Robert J. Shiller, Speculative
Prices and Popular Models, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1990, at 55.
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maion, would enlarge the number of informed traders who would take
advantage of the fluctuations in price caused by the uninformed. This
would enable the uninformed to trade with less of an adverse price
move, allowing an equilibrium of informed and uninformed traders to
be reached.
The opposite example, that of a market dominated by uninformed
traders, would show signs of great liquidity but little efficiency. Prices
would move in response to random shifts in uninformed trading.' The
puzzle in this market would be why informed traders do not enter to
take advantage of the deviation in prices and render the market effi-
cient. An overbroad insider trading prohibition may well lead to insuf-
ficient informed trading. The tax treatment of trading profits, and any
regulation imposing excessive costs on aggregations of capital (which
would form funds with the power necessary to correct such price
moves), are also possible culprits for the insufficiency of informed trad-
ing. Another suspect could be insufficient disclosure, which creates a
small and insufficiently competitive group of informed traders who
allow prices to deviate widely from "true value" so as to maximize the
profits they extract in correcting them. In any case, the reason whyuninformed traders keep trading, despite the high volatility and despite
the market's inefficiency, must also be examined. It may be possible
that a fad causes the return from the market to be (or be perceived as)
very high, or the risk to be low.8 Disclosure may disperse the irratio-
85. See supra note 53 (large trades cause short term price moves).
86. The literature on irrationalities has developed significantly since the latter part of the
eighties. Different forms of irrationalities cause different reactions to the marke. The source of
the trouble is that in securities markets, the mix of "rational expectaios" agents with the less-
than-rational agents results in tendencies away from equilibrium. In other forums it may be
possible that the mixing of rational and irrational agents works to the advantage of all. For ex-
ample. rationals help irrationals (and vice versa) in the context or traffic congestions. because
the rational follow uncongested mutes, while if all agents were rational they would congest
these alternate mutes. A third alternative is markets with reputation importance. wher either
group will dominate. See generally John Haltiwanger & Micel Waldman. Rational Erpecta-
tions and the Limits of Rationality: An Analysis of Heterogeneity, 75 AM. ECOx. REv. 326
(1985).
The stock-market-irrationalities literature is increasing. See, eg., . Bradford Da Long et al.,
The Survival of Noise Traders in Financial Markets, 64 . Bus. 1 (1991); 3. Bradford De Long
et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 3. POL ECO.. 703 (1990) (noise traders
create risk, which deters rational traders from taking positions of the size necessary to correct
prices); J. Bradford De Long et al., Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing
Rational Speculation, 45 J. FIN. 379 (1990) (the existence of noiss traders that "follow the
crowd," as, for example, does portfolio insurance, may induce rational traders to anticipate such
trends, enter in their beginning, and initiate them); Kenneth A. Froot & Maurice Obstfeld In-
trinsic Bubbles: The Case of Stock Prices (1989) (NBER working paper No. 3091) (building a
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nality in prices by subsidizing informed traders and, possibly, disillu-
sioning some uninformed traders, so that the rational traders dominate
the market.87
IV. SUPPORT FROM LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The notion that the optimal regulation of insider trading is deter-
mined by the liquidity of the regulated market is supported by the
history and comparative regulation of insider trading as well as by
securities regulation in general. Insider trading became an issue for the
first time after the crash of 1929, when the market had reached a new
level of trading activity. Thereafter, the simple and narrow insider trad-
ing rules of section sixteen of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
sufficed for roughly thirty years. 8 During the 1960s, as the market
again was reaching new volume and liquidity levels, Rule lOb-5 began
to be interpreted as a rule against insider trading. The new, but poorly
understood, evil of insider trading was sought to be regulated ever more
tightly in the 1970s, as the "equal access" theory began to take the
foreground.89 The "equal access" theory, however, was put to rest by
the United States Supreme Court in Chiarella v. United States. ° The
upper boundary on the breadth of an insider trading prohibition had
perhaps been reached. The retreat of the "equal access" theory and its
substitution by the slightly narrower and much better defined "misap-
propriation" and mail and wire fraud theories as bases for insider trad-
ing liability can be seen as a retreat from the previously excessive
prohibition of informed trading.
International comparisons offer the same conclusions. Of all the
model of bubbles based on the rate of increase of dividends, which accurately matches the
historical path of stock prices); Kenneth E. Froot et al., Herd on the Street: Informational Ineffi-
ciencies in a Market with Short-Term Speculation (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (1991) (developing a model where pursuing one type of information and disregarding
another may be the dominant strategy, creating a market efficient as to the former information
and inefficient as to the latter).
87. I develop the role of disclosure rules as a disillusionment of the irrational and a subsidy
to the rational traders in a different context. See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Disclosure Rules
as a Measure against Irrationalities (Sept. 1, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author);
Georgakopoulos, supra note 5.
88. Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits round-trip trades within six
months by directors and officers. Their profits are recoverable by the corporation. Section 16
also imposes filing after all trades of insiders. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1988). See supra note 17.
89. For an explanation of the "equal access" theory, see supra note 25 and accompanying
text.
90. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). The Supreme Court reversed the most unambiguous expression of
the equal access theory set forth by the lower court. Id. at 231-35.
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countries with stock exchanges, the United States, having the most liq-
uid exchanges, was the first to institute new and stricter insider trading
rules. Countries with illiquid exchanges, on the other hand, seem never
to have shared the regulatory concern of the United States.
The SEC's drive for international cooperation in securities regula-
tion can also be plausibly explained in terms of the hypothesis present-
ed by this Article. The internationalization of securities markets often
means that the same securities are traded in more exchanges, possibly
contemporaneously, despite differences in time zones. Evidence indicates
that for each security traded in several markets, the original, primary
market in which the security is traded often remains the most liquid
market.9" If a certain trading practice is illegal according to the forum
of the primary market, traders can flock to other markets having more
relaxed regulation. As long as there are no arbitrage possibilities that
would correlate the prices in both markets, there is little wrong with
this regulation-evasive trading. The insiders who trade in the illiquid
market will move prices or, having driven uninformed traders away,
will be unable to find trading partners. When both exchanges are open
contemporaneously, however, arbitrage will furnish the insiders at the
second exchange with trading partners and liquidity that is transferred,
essentially, from the primary exchange. While this increased trading
activity is not to the disadvantage of the illiquid market, it costs the
liquid market almost as much as a repeal of its securities regulation.
The costs per trade of uninformed traders will rise. As a result, the
picture presented in this Article unravels. It is only natural that the SEC
has been concerned about international cooperation in regulation of
securities markets. What is surprising is that the less liquid exchanges
succumbed to the SEC's pressure.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article presents the notion that the regulation of insider trading
both reduces the per-transaction amount that uninformed traders lose to
informed traders and increases the competition among informed trad-
ers.' Reducing transaction costs leads directly to more efficient mar-
91. See Barclay et al., supra note 66.
92. This Article's treatment of insider trading as a transaction cost partially refutes the banz-
fit of insider trading that is traditionally espoused - namely that by impounding more informa-
tion into prices, insider trading increases efficiency and reduces risk, leading to higher prices.
The assumption that securities prices will change to reflect the reduction of risk due to faster
incorporation of information in prices is based on the notion that risk accounts for the level of
securities prices and their approximate historical return rate of 8.7 above inflation (the "equity
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kets, better allocation of resources, and eventually to a lower cost of
capital.93
The current law on insider trading is consistent with the analysis
presented in this Article, particularly if we take into account practical
considerations. Under the misappropriation and mail and wire fraud
theories, one becomes an insider by having such an advantage in get-
ting the information that we can reasonably infer that he would have
the ability to trade strategically.
The ideal rule on insider trading should not be a blanket prohibi-
tion, but should only delay the trading of insiders. The rule should
delay the first classes of traders only until sufficient competition accu-
mulates. Such a "delaying" rule would make a narrower definition of
insider trader possible. Imagine that the competition among fewer than
three traders was insufficient for a market. In a world where informa-
tion spreads first to a single informed trader, then to another two, and
then to another three, a "prohibitory" rule would ban the trading of the
first two classes. A "delaying" rule would only need to postpone the
trading of the first class.
The narrower insider trading definition of a delaying rule would
also lessen any misallocation of information pursuit caused by insider
trading rules. It would allow the market participants with the greatest
advantage in seeking information to inject such information into prices.
By contrast, a prohibitory rule would force entities with a comparative
disadvantage to pursue and bring the information to the market. Not
only is the market informed more slowly, but also at a greater expense,
particularly if the traders who bring the information would, under the
delaying rule, be able to profit by bringing yet more information to the
market. Given the practicalities of insider trading regulation, however, a
delaying rule does not appear immediately possible. The strictness of
the current rule, which requires insiders to wait until the information is
public, however, may also be excessive, since it would be better to
premium"). Studies, however, have failed to justify the equity premium by the risk associated
with stocks. See Mehra & Prescott, supra note 11; Stephen J. Fisher, Asset Trading, Transaction
Costs and the Equity Premium (July 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). In
addition to Mehra & Prescott, who point out that risk only explains 0.4% of the 6-8% historical
risk premium, Fisher uses transaction costs to justify 4% of the equity premium. Id. If the
approximately 20% annual volatility fails to explain the 8% equity premium, a marginal de-
crease in risk due to faster adjustment of prices to inside information, which may even leave
the annual volatility unchanged, is unlikely to have an effect on prices sufficient to justify un-
fettered insider trading, particularly in view of the ensuing increased transaction costs.
93. See supra note 69.
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allow insiders to trade as soon as their competition does.
Given the present situation, the practicable change that is needed is
the correlation of insider trading rules with market liquidity. The stage
for such an interpretation is set. The lack of a statutory definition of
insider trading is fortunate. As Part II showed, the theories of insider
trading liability-the "duty to disclose or abstain" theory, the misappro-
priation theory, and the mail and wire fraud theory-are each amenable
to widening or narrowing interpretations.' The liquidity of the market
for the shares of the traded corporation should be the gauge of the
breadth of the prohibition in the application of these theories. The li-
quidity of the market should similarly influence the SEC's definition of
insiders under section sixteen. Although liquidity cannot yet be precise-
ly measured and defined, reasonable proxies for liquidity are the dollar
trading volume, the turnover (i.e. the proportion of shares that change
hands annually), and the "float" (i.e., the proportion of the equity that
is held by the public). The definition of insider trading with respect to
shares having great trading volume, large turnover, and large float
should be much broader than the definition associated with thinly traded
shares having a low turnover, of which the public only holds a small
minority.
One can infer from this Article that extraordinary analysts, having
such an advantage that they are in essence monopolists, should also be
prohibited from trading. If analysts are so skilled that they do not face
competition in their trading, the prohibition against monopolistic trading
should apply. Belief that one's information is exclusive should be suf-
ficient to trigger insider trading liability. This addition of a new sub-
stantive element of the offense involving the offender's state of mind
would be the first significant departure of the federal insider trading
jurisprudence from the common law priciple of deceit. By examining
the suspect monopolist's trading, it should be easy to determine whether
he traded aggressively, thus believing that he faced competition, or
passively, thus establishing prima facie evidence that he believed he
was a monopolist.95 The incentive to trade aggressively that such a
94. See supra Part I1.
95. Notice that such a new mens rea element may indicate that Dirks was wrongly decided
since Dirks was aware of the exclusive nature of his information. Although this Article's pro-
posal renders the reasoning of Dirks unnecessary, its outcome must still be supported. Dirks did
try to announce his information and bring it to the SEC's attention. When a monopolist tradr
cannot find competition after a certain time and effort in good faith, he must be allowed to
trade even as a monopolist. The value of his limited correction of prices and his promotion of
market efficiency is sufficient to overcome the adverse.selection transaction cost that his profits
19931
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
rule would instill upon traders having doubts about their insider status
is also desirable, particularly in comparison with the current rules,
which give traders the incentive to hide trades and emulate monopolis-
tic strategic trading.
Beyond these recommendations, this Article finds a deeper harmony
within securities regulation. Securities regulation consists of numerous
specific rules regulating behavior in the financial markets. Two large
categories of rules can be discerned. Most rules impose either disclosure
or restrictions on trading. Disclosure rules play an integral part in the
optimal regulation of insider trading. Regardless of what other purposes
may be served by disclosure, it ensures ample availability of informa-
tion for potential informed traders. The ease of entry into the ranks of
informed traders preserves and fosters the competition among the mem-
bers of the group. Absent disclosure requirements, the competition that
insider trading rules foster could fail.'
More difficult than harmonizing disclosure with insider trading rules
is the harmonization of securities regulation with the regulation of mar-
kets for non-financial goods. Strict regulation of markets for certain
products is certainly common. The uniform austerity with which all
products in the securities markets are treated, however, is striking.
While this Article does not attempt fully to explain the disparity, a
unique difference in securities markets is the importance of uninformed
participants. In markets for real goods, there is less of a need for unin-
formed participation. Purchasers of non-financial goods tend to be the
ones determining the value of the goods through the utility they derive
from them. Prices of non-financial goods demanded and supplied in this
fashion allocate resources optimally without much need for further regulation.
The importance of uninformed participation seems to be unique to
create. The concern about efficiency in this case will override the concern about the transaction
costs of uninformed traders. If, however, the problem of establishing the time and effort spent
trying to bring information to the market becomes commonplace, then it justifies economically
the adoption of a simple policing structure and the delaying rule. Traders who believe they have
exclusive information would announce it to the SEC confidentially and wait until either the SEC
informs them that they have enough competition or until the allotted time lapses.
96. The issue of possible barriers to entry is not directly relevant to this Article. It is possi-
ble to imagine that processing intricate information may involve barriers to entry. A related jus-
tification has been offered for the lack of discretion in the form of disclosure: uniform disclo-
sure is easier to process. See Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, The Optimal Amount
of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure, 105 QJ. ECON. 427 (1990). Fishman and Hagerty's model
favors restricting the freedom of disclosure if there are numerous uninformed parties in the
market, whereas complete discretion is favored in markets that have traders with the savvy to
interpret different disclosure forms.
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the securities markets. Reasons may be many, but they exceed the
scope of this Article. One of the most apparent reasons for the need for
market participation by uninformed traders (who also personify liquid-
ity) revolves around the fact that securities are priced at two levels. On
one level, the total supply of investment capital and its demand set
interest rates and risk premiums. Uninformed investors play an integral
part in the supply of capital. On another level, uninformed investors do
not play any role in the pricing of individual securities. Specific secu-
rities will be priced by informed investors, but their existence requires
the liquidity and the fluctuations in supply and demand that the unin-
formed provide. Without this, the market will perish in the efficiency
paradox.97
97. An appendix to this Article, which solves analytically a 20-trade optimization if w=l and
shows why analytical results for wl were not obtained, is on file with the author.
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